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I.

INTRODUCTION

The case against allowing corporations to indemnify directors for
amounts directors pay to settle derivative litigation appears overwhelming. The logic against indemnification is circularity of recovery--the
corporation returns the recovered amounts to the wrongdoer and, after
paying its own expenses and those of the plaintiff, is invariably a net
loser. The case and logic against indemnification is persuasive to the
vast majority of the states, including Delaware, and to 'the drafters of
both the American Bar Association Model Business Corporation Act
("Model Act") 1 and the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Govemance. 2 The intuitive reaction of a sophisticated nonlawyer
observer is even more decided--allowing a suit in which an acceptable
outcome of a successful suit is a net loss for the plaintiff and a wash for
the defendant is akin to setting- up a system for lawyers to pursue
lawsuits without plaintiffs. 3
The little scrutinized legal bar on such indemnification rests within a
system for litigation to redress directorial misconduct that is heavily
1. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association, which
developed the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (3d ed. 1994) ("Model Act"), recently
adopted revisions to the provisions for indemnification and advance for expenses of the
Model Act. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business

Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Indemnification and Advance for Expenses,
49 Bus. LAW. 741, 741 (1994) (proposed amendments); Committee on Corporate Laws,

Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to
Indemnification and Advance for Expenses, 49 Bus. LAW. 1823, 1823 (1994) (final
adoption).
The Committee publishes the Model Act not merely as a persuasive model for
comparison but as law which many state legislatures substantially enact into their state
corporation codes. Elliott Goldstein, CORPRO: A Committee That Became an
Institution, 48 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1334 (1994); see also DEBORAH A. DEMOTT,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE§ 6:37 (1994) (stating that
many states have indemnification statutes drawn from the Model Act and the Revised
Model Act).
The changes deserve careful scrutiny because of their probable influence on state
code provisions governing indemnification, the importance to public corporations of the
provisions protecting directors from large unreimbursed personal liabilities, and the
unusual complexity of the subject. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra, at 749
(referring to provisions for indemnification and advance of expenses as "among the most
complex and important in the entire Act").
2. Members of the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance, Project (ALI)
created and adopted THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATiONS (Proposed Final Draft Mar. 31,
1992)[hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE]. These principles differ from the case of
the Model Act, which .state legislatures often enact into state corporate law. See
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1334 (describing the Corporate Governance Project).
3. Interview with David Lapin, CPCU; Vice President, Underwriting, Executive
Risk Indemnity, Inc., in Detroit, Michigan (Jan. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Interview].
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criticized as driven by perverse incentives.4 For the most part, commentary on the system of corporate litigation takes for granted the fundamental institutional factors that drive lawsuits brought on behalf of investors.
Policy evaluations of such litigation are derived from a premise of an
atomized moral climate--self-protecting boards,5 greedy lawyers,6
passive shareholders,7 and profit-oriented insurance companies that
control funds which make attractive targets for lawsuits. 8 Despite the
ferment apparent in recent proposals for new rules and even new legal
entities to alter the "market mechanisms" for corporate litigation,9

4. The mildest descriptions of the shortcomings of derivative litigation are
fundamental to the understanding of the remedy. They simply allude to the possibilities
of abuse. See, e.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 712 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994) (citing
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 7.40-7.47 introductory cmt. at 195 (1991) for
proposition that derivative action is susceptible to abuse). See generally John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985).
The negative assessment of the usefulness of derivative suits has intensified in recent
years in academic writing and in the popular press. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Paying

Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of
Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 949 (1993) (stating that there is increasing
evidence that derivative suits (and class actions) substantially diminish the return to
investors in American companies); see also Dan Cordtz & Jennifer Reingold, The

Vanishing Director Lawsuits, Angry Shareholders and Public Criticism Make Board
Duty Unpopular, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 12, 1993, at 22 (referring to potential directors'
well-founded fear of being hauled into court by some disgruntled shareholder).
5. James D. Cox, Searching/or the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Litigation:
A Critique a/Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (describing use of
"special litigation committees" by boards of directors to, invariably, recommend
dismissal of derivative suits).
6. See John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law
Institute Faces the Derivative Action; Symposium of Corporate Governance, 48 Bus.
LAW. 1407, 1429 n.81 (1993) (noting negative view of idea of"entrepreneurial" lawyers
not constrained by clients); id. at 1436 (referring to clearcut evidence of settlements of
little benefit to shareholders but very lucrative for plaintiffs' lawyers).
7. Id.; see also Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board
in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44
Bus. LAW. 503, 520 (1989) (describing statutory rationale for relegating shareholders to
a passive role).
8. See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 560-64 (1991) (discussing strategic
considerations of insurance companies in providing insurance and funding settlements).·
9. Both the 103d Congress and the current 104th Congress saw the introduction
of bills intended to trim the extent of corporate litigation in the context of securities class
actions. Many of the areas of policy change concern alteration of the incentives that
drive this type of corporate litigation. For a summary of the bill introduced in 1994 by
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fundamental assumptions about the moral climate that underlies the
ground rules for corporate litigation, including the indemnification bar,
are mostly intact in the literature. The rationale for the bar, and the
possible arguments for removing it, deserve a concentrated examination
that they have not received, not only for the possibility of altering policy
but also for the insights into the practical differences between the
predominant system of resolving derivative suits and its possible
extension (through more liberal indemnification).
A.

Summary of Argument

This Article presents the case for permitting boards to settle cases by
allowing a director to acknowledge liability, pay a sum of money to the
corporation, and receive its prompt return from the corporation. To see
the question as clearly as possible, the crassest statement of the
procedure should be set forth. The corporate board, which universally
opposes derivative litigation, would be allowed to end a lawsuit by
bribing the lawyers for the shareholders with a fee to allow the board to
rescue an errant director from financial liability. While called a
"settlement," the transaction is not really a settlement in the true sense,
a settlement being a compromise between two opposing parties who
sacrifice possible gains to reach a middle position. The proposed
procedure is a use of corporate resources to end a lawsuit by bribing the
two flesh and blood "parties"-the defendant(s) and the plaintiff's

Senator Dodd, see Joel Seligman, The Implications a/Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429,
1429 (1994) {citing 140 CONG. REC. S3695-704 {daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994)).
A substantially similar bill, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), known as the
"Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995," was introduced in the 104th Congress.
A key provision directed at the alteration of the litigation "market" was the creation of
a guardian ad !item mechanism for shareholder classes in securities class actions. The
bill was enacted by the 104th Congress and became law over the veto of President
Clinton. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995). Rather than a guardian ad !item, the law provides for the naming by the court
of a "lead plaintiff' in securities class actions. In addition, the law alters procedures and
standards for securities actions in a variety of ways sought by publicly traded companies.
See Litigation Reform: Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform
Bill Now Law, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 3 (1995) (describing views of opposing
sides and content of law); see also Litigation Reform: Industry Hails Veto Override,
Consumer Groups, Others Opposed, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 5 (1995) (discussing
President's veto and adverting to controversy over pleading requirement).
A similar approach was advanced by Professors Weiss and Beckerman, who
suggested that courts adopt policies to encourage institutional investors to serve as lead
plaintiffs, since as large stakeholders, such investors would have appropriate incentives
to decide whether litigation would be beneficial to a corporation's shareholders. See
Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Talldng: How Institutionalized Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2105-12 (1995).
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lawyer. The fundamental. argument for allowing this to occur is
procedural and is presented in Section IV.
The argument is defensive in nature. Roughly stated, while corporations are not permitted to bat away derivative suits by an unrestricted
power to dismiss them, subject only to review in a second lawsuit under
the business judgment rule, they are permitted to establish a mechanism,
the special litigation committee ("SLC"), that invariably asks and
frequently persuades a court to dismiss a suit as not in the corporation's
best interests. Such a mechanism grants substantial leverage to the ·
targets--corporate boards and management-who universally resist,
indeed disdain, shareholder initiated efforts to recover damages from
directors for injuries to the corporation. The SLC method of terminating
suits is an anti-corporate litigation device, either lamented or praised,
depending on one's view of the worthwhileness of derivative litigation.
Given the existence of the leverage accorded boards to achieve the
dismissal of suits, permitting boards to fund settlements through
indemnification--i.e., to "kick" the suit by lubricating the parties with
money instead of a judge with reasons--is no worse an alternative.
Critically, it achieves precisely the same net payment-zero--from the
defendant. The advantage is that it nets the goose egg at a lesser cost
and with less delay. That is, it is a faster and cheaper route to
frustration.
Viewing the comparison of SLC dismissal and indemnification-funded
settlement purely as a comparison of procedures and assuming naively
that the board would settle the same suits that the court would have
dismissed, the latter is unambiguously the superior procedure. If it
produces the same substance, then the faster and cheaper procedure is
superior.
Identifying the principle negative requires reducing the naivete of the
assumption. The removal of the court from the decision takes away a
disinterested body and substitutes one of keen partiality. Despite the use
of subgroups buffered from direct enmeshment in the defendants'
interests, no mechanism for board created purity bleaches the board to
the tint of an outside, independent body. One must concede that if sent
to separate rooms to reach a resolution, it is unlikely that the court and
the board would make all the same choices.
The significance of this substantive difference can be thought of in at
least three ways. First, in an indemnification resolution, the court takes
a limited look at the payment arrangements when it approves a

1067

settlement (statutes require settlements be approved). Indemnification is
not, however, a point of emphasis; it is more nearly a point of information for the judge of a "be advised" tenor. Second, the board has
theoretical liability for wrongful indemnification (indemnity is only
authorized when the director has met certain statutory standards and,
implicitly, when it serves the corporation's interests). Secondary liability
constitutes a safeguard. The safeguard can be strengthened by carving
out from the liability-elimination authorizations of corporate codes the
decision by a board to grant indemnity. Third, reputational factors
would discipline any inclination. of boards to grant indemnity lawlessly.
Code provisions mandate disclosure of indemnity payments in periodic
reports to shareholders. Because almost any shareholder, whether a naif
or a callow sophisticate, will experience such a disclosure as a startling
revelation, the pressure for boards to act only on the basis of credible
(and creditable) reasons will be high, arguably higher than hiring lawyers
to build a case for dismissal to present in court:
To the extent these answers to the problem of director partiality are
persuasive, they also provide reassurance on the issue of whether the
procedure, in comparison with court dismissals, weakens deterrence. In
reviewing the salient arguments against the procedure, this Article argues
that deterrence is not weakened.
The most jaded observer of derivative litigation might suggest, "Why
go through a complex so-called settlement? Just give the board the plain
vanilla power to dismiss derivative suits. It's even cheaper and faster,
and it creates the same result as a dismissal by a court or an indemnification lubricated 'settlement'. Won't the same arguments about cheaper
faster results support that result, too?"
The answer is one of political realism. While the logic is the same,
giving boards the power to fund settlements--throw cases out-is done
in the framework of established conventions. Indeed, half a dozen-states
authorize the procedure. The proposal to strip all the forms that afford
derivative suits-from docketing to disposition-the label of litigation
is too unsettling. By comparison, the suggestion has sometimes been
made. to dispense with derivative suit plaintiffs, since they are figureheads only. The answer to both suggestions is, in essence, a breezy
brushoff. The form with which we are familiar is litigation: plaintiff(s),
lawyer(s), defendant(s), with either adjudication or party resolutions. For
the viewer and the participants, the outlines of the forms must be
preserved. Any abuse of the form is more readily monitored by
shareholders than would be rank use of a general authority to "kick"
suits. Reports of litigation not pursued would lack the jolt to shareholders that reports of circular trips of damages would generate.

1068

[VOL. 32: 1063, 1995]

Neglected Policy Option
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Thus, the practical proposal for quicker process through director
indemnification upon settlement of charges is worthy of a closer look.
No other short-circuiting beyond the SLC method is a reasonable
alternative.
On the basis of the weak statement of the case for the procedure, it
deserves more of a look than it receives. Despite the uncertainty of
lessening the friction that impedes the board's response to derivative
litigation from being risklessly enacted in every instance, when
juxtaposed to SLC dismissals, a 'settlement' method can be seen to
make sense in the existing balance of power between management and
shareholders.
This Article also raises the question of whether permitting the
procedure might generate social good aside from the simple efficiencies
that abbreviations of process necessarily produce. The issue is framed
in a positive manner, unlike the core argument, which asserts that
indemnification-driven termination is not patently worse than the
termination process that exists. The reasoning about benefits to be taken
from greater board leeway needs to be undertaken more cautiously. The
argument that board dispositions may produce benefits beyond more
efficient procedure could appear to suggest that the decisions of boards
to end cases (or not) are more often "accurate" than are the decisions of
courts. Such a suggestion would be an extremely conservative claim
since the types of cases SLC's seek courts to dismiss are "demand
excused," in which board capacity to act appropriately is sharply suspect.
Thus, the general presumption of board regularity accorded to the board
decision is not present, and to suggest that allowing the board to make
the decision might produce superior outcomes would reflect an
extraordinarily negative assessment of judicial oversight. 10

10. The view that a court created disposition is manifestly superior to any board
created outcome is, on the surface, somewhat at odds with the analysis of the logic of
indemnification. See infra text accompanying notes 99-111. In that material, indemnification is conceptualized as an escape hatch from the regime of liability administered by
courts, in which formal legal liability can be viewed as overinclusive. Under this
reasoning, one should view agnostically in a given case the matter of whether the court
or the board, if hypothetically differing, would have rendered the more "efficient"
distributional solution between the corporation and the director. See infra text
accompanying notes 108-111.
The impediment to such a blithe acceptance of difference is a combination of
"structural bias" and the tethering at all times of board choices to the best interests of
the corporation. Indeed, when a board makes a motion asking a court to dismiss a
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Thus, any hypothesis that board dispositions may create a good result
must be carefully framed to exclude, as an element of the comparison
with court dispositions, the question of the rightness of the outcome, i.e.,
the board's or court's yea or nay to the suit. The issues raised in this
Article concern the collateral effects of the proposed increase of board
authority on the participants and on the quality of the board's conduct
in responding to derivative suits. Principally, the question concerns the
possibility that accountability of the board would increase from
reconfigured statutes that seek to create a defensible mechanism for a
more direct board role in case dispositions. In addition, the possibility
seems worth thinking about that the availability of this procedure might
reduce the central role assumed by insurance companies in protecting
executives from monetary liability,. and thus in shaping the litigation
environment and imposing costs on corporations.
The suggestion in the second. set of materials beyond the · core
argument is not, then, that the litigation process should be short-circuited
on the basis that it produces mistaken outcomes, but that perhaps
litigation could be shaped to produce social good not brought to the fore
by an outcome, albeit a comparatively trustworthy one, purchased at the
price of full-bore adversarial process. The second set of materials also
proposes that corporate statutes could be designed to reward corporations
for strengthening personal board accountability for litigation decisions
rather than handing the same one-size-fits-all provisions for litigation to
all corporations. The goal is to encourage defensible models of

derivative suit, it does it in the form of a conclusion that the litigation is not in the best
interests of the corporation. The court adopts the conclusion if it respects the
independence of the recommending group appointed by the board and the credibility of
the investigation on which the recommendation is based.
By hypothesis, that standard should not. change because the board will make the
decision without the need to persuade the court. Since the decision is prospective, the
substantive decision of the board and the court should be the same; that is, indemnification in this context is not a separate question from that of the imposition of legal
liability. The two "domains" of decision-making fold into one. The best interests
determination of whether to go forward necessarily includes an assumption that litigation
of liability may serve the corporation, even if the legal rule is arguably overinclusive.
A board decision to indemnify in the context of ending a piece of litigation that the court
would take to an adverse judgment against the director chokes off adversarial
development of the legal doctrines and thus requires a cautious deployment, in practice
and in theory, despite the fundamental point that doctrines of liability may be
overinclusive..
In contrast, indemnification after a judgment is imposed by the court would fit more
comfortably into the theoretical point that indemnification is an escape hatch from an
overinclusive legal regime. Paradoxically, under classic corporate doctrine, post hoc
indemnification is virtually impossible to justify, on the grounds that a corporate
payment without a return benefit is corporate waste. See infra text accompanying notes
189-91.
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corporate resolution of legally meritorious shareholder litigation, which
might soften the negative climate of opinion surrounding derivative
litigation driven by entrepreneurial lawyers and defensive boards.

B.

The Consensus

In many respects the level of development of the rationale for the
professional consensus about indemnification and that for the lay
response are comparable. Each conforms to ready intuition and largely
disengages from the context of derivative litigation. The influence of
intuition is apparent. Both the lawyer's and the lay person's rejection
of indemnification gain their force from a reaction against the apparent
illogic of a system that fosters lawsuits where the winner of a civil
monetary judgment by design would in many instances receive no actual
recovery. 11 The consensus is disengaged from context in that it fails
to consider the incentives of the players in derivative litigation, most
especially the board of directors, the nominal plaintiff in a derivative
suit. In addition, the consensus fails to consider the impact of alternative
statutory "grids" for derivative suit resolutions on these incentives. The
noncontextual .nature of the reasoning about the question exacerbates the
legal tendency to make policy based on minimal empirical reasoning or
evidence or, at best, on the basis of common sensical bromides with a
modicum of empirical content 12 or even a "mischaracterization of
available evidence." 13

11.

See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 958.
Another exception historically found in most statutes precludes
indemnification of judgments and amounts paid in settling or
otherwise disposing of actions by or in the right of the corporation.
The basis for this rule is a belief that it would be circular if funds
received by the corporation (the ultimate plaintiff on whose behalf an
action by or in the right of the corporation is brought) were simply
returned to the defendant director who paid them.

Id.

12. Cf Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time/or Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1480 (1984) (referring to divergence
between "reality-based" articulation of duty of care rule and traditional doctrinal
formulations of the director's duty of care).
13. See Seligman, supra note 9, at 1433 (suggesting U.S. Supreme Court
mischaracterized available evidence in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct.
1439 (1994)).
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The noncontextual content of the professional consensus 14 and the lay
reaction concerning indemnification of settlement amounts has a variety
of results. First, a limited conception of the ethos and function of
indemnification creates a poor fit with the law's prevailing treatment of
other aspects of derivative suit litigation and more general corporate law
principles.
Second, the consensus ignores possible avenues of reform. For
example, the prevailing view fails to relate ground rules for disposing of
derivative litigation to concrete questions about techniques for improving
the functioning of boards of directors as the "conscience" of management.15 If the statutory pathways to terminate derivative litigation are
viewed in the context of evolving models for board operation, 16 the
analysis of policy choices should become richer by virtue of taking into
account the moral climate of the board room, 17 the aspirational effect
on board deliberation of modes of terminating derivative suits, 18 and
the situational impact of alternative legal rules on the players in
derivative litigation. 19

14. The consensus is substantial. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 90506 ("Most . . . statutes expressly deny indemnification to directors and officers of
judgments or amounts paid in settlement of derivative actions, and permit indemnification in such actions only for reasonable expenses incurred in the proceeding.").
A majority of states (28) expressly .bar indemnification for amounts paid in settlement
while a small minority (nine) expressly permit it, with an additional six permitting it but
only with court approval. Id. at 925; see also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 958-61
(discussing the apparent trend toward allowing indemnification of settlement amounts
with court approval).
The new Model Act indemnification sections contain a provision that can be
described in general terms as allowing indemnification of settlement amounts where a
director can persuade a court of facts "peculiar to his circumstances" warranting such
indemnification. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 768 (setting forth
revised § 8.54(a)(3)). With the adoption of the new Model Act provision for court
approval, it may be expected that more states will allow a version of indemnification of
settlement amounts upon court approval rather than an absolute bar. See infra text
accompanying notes 231-35.
15. See Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37, 39-40 (discussing function of board as "corporate
conscience" to prevent ''unconscionable conduct").
16. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside
Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5, 7-15 (1989) (describing functions of the board
of directors in the "monitoring model" of corporate governance as involving, among
other functions, attention to compliance with "substantive law and appropriate ethical
precepts" and direct involvement in transactions relating to transfers of control).
17. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1409 (stating that a view of the board's capacity
or objectivity is not the underlying basis of the ALI approach to derivative litigation).
18. Cf id. at 1415-16 (noting that the demand required/demand excused distinction
paradoxically minimizes the board's role in derivative litigation and places the decision
about litigation in the court's hands).
19. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 529-48, 558-66 (surveying the incentives of
participants in class action litigation).
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Third, a noncontextual approach to board ability.to indemnify fails to
cast light on the practical rationale of the entire Model Act, which
includes a provision for disclosure of indemnification payments. 20 This
provision has the potential to buttress a vision of the corporate board's
role in managing and settling derivative litigation as one combining
efficiency, accountability, and moral aspiration. 21 A view of indemnification as a board option that might foster the good of greater information for shareholders about derivative litigation should alter the calculus
of cost and benefit that non-situational reasoning about "circular"
movement of money assumes. A purposive conception of shareholder
litigation as seeking net positive results measured by the recovery by the
corporation from individual lawsuits, compared with the outlay, focuses
evaluation on a narrow cost-benefit analysis. This is perhaps less useful
than a conception that asks what system-wide, prospective and casespecific, benefits can arise from mechanisms for resolution of shareholder suits that lift the moral climate of the boardroom by forcing a process
of dialogue and. disclosure.
Fourth, failing to analyze board indemnification of directors for
settlement amounts contextually-by comparing it with court dismissal
of derivative suits--directs attention away from the possibility that such
indemnification may be superior as a board accountability device to
either a court dismissal granted, at the instance of a board initiated
corporate motion, 22 or to settlements funded by insurance payments,
made by insurance companies facing their highest risk of exposure for
bad faith claim denial. 23
Fifth, the analytic neglect of the function of indemnification in the
overall context of derivative litigation is unfortunate in light of the

20. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 16.21 (1984) ("Other Reports to
Shareholders").
21. Cf Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wrs. L.
REV. 573, 588 (discussing the deterrent effect of moral opprobrium resulting from
publicity as weapon against insider trading) (citing Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 78
(J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)).
22. See infra text accompanying note 159.
23. Interview, supra note 3; see Eugene R. Anderson et al., Liability Insurance:
A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 49 Bus. LAW. 259, 270-72 (1993) (describing the
"duty to indemnify" and the "duty to defend" under the Commercial General Liability
Policy); see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 561 (describing insurance company
exposure for bad faith refusal to settle).
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momentum gained by efforts to sharply limit litigation by corporate
shareholders. Close attention to indemnification might direct attention
to nuanced reform possibilities that would discipline the process of
derivative litigation by conferring authority to indemnify while finetuning the limitation of liability rules24 to provide a real discipline on
boards when they make the decision to indemnify another director. 25
Paradoxically, increasing corporate boards' authority to indemnify, if
done with careful attention to the context of corporate litigation and the
"non-givenness" of the general moral climate surrounding such litigation,
might be a means of placing greater legal and moral pressure on boards
to achieve defensible resolutions of derivative suits.
Finally, the noncontextual character of the consensus is consistent with
the general analytic neglect of the settlement process in corporate
litigation. While the character of corporate settlements-in particular,
the extent of their relation to the merits of cases-is controversial,26
there is general consensus that settlements are the predominant mode of
disposition of derivative suits.27 Yet the level of attention given to the

24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting charter amendments to
eliminate liability of directors for fiduciary duty of care breaches); MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) (Supp. 1994).
25. Cf Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 573 (1990) (softening argument that mandatory rules
have limited effect to suggest that mandatory rules may influence managers in such a
way that agency costs are reduced). This Article suggests that greater freedom might
have a salutary effect on the corporate culture. Cf id. at 573 (considering effect on
corporate culture of legal rules compared with professional norms).
26. Compare Alexander, supra note 8, at 522-23, 566-68 with Joseph A. Grundfest,
Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 739-43 (1995) and Seligman, supra note 9, at
1434 (concerning the merits of class action suits that settle). See also Joel Seligman,
The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfert's "Disimplying Private
Rights ofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws: the Commission's Authority," 108
HARV. L. REV. 438, 448-57 (1994).
27. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1436 (citing Roberta Romano, The Shareholder
Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG 56 (1991)).
As mentioned above, the term 'settlement' is largely a misnomer, since a derivative
suit settlement is not a compromise between two parties with opposed interests but a
collusive agreement to end a lawsuit by financing the lawyers' fees and the damages.
Yet a derivative suit settlement shares in common with real settlements the feature that
the parties decide to reach a non-adversarial ending to a legal dispute. The process is
disciplined by the rules set forth in the statutes giving the court some role in approving
settlements and not by the opposing interests framed by a legal dispute between true
adversaries. Thus, although it is not a mere quibble to say that derivative suit
settlements share few characteristics with the settlements about which literature has
developed, it is nonetheless the case that a non-adversarial resolution of legal matters
will produce effects different from full-bore litigation. The literature on settlement is
relevant to the question of what benefits (or negatives) might arise from a process that
relocates the disposition of cases from adjudication to negotiation among the participants.

1074

[VOL. 32: 1063, 1995]

Neglected Policy Option
SAN DIEGO LAW REVI_EW

dynamics and effects of derivative suit settlement by statutes and
scholars is scant. Policy discussions are necessarily impoverished. 28
The r_eal-world effect of the prohibition is to limit board authority on
a subject of critical importance to any business-the bringing and
management of litigation. A code provision prohibiting corporations
from indemnifying directors creates a gap in the corporate board's
capacity to manage derivative litigation. in the interests of the corporation._29 Board influence over the termination of derivative litigation is·
otherwise affirmed by, and indeed central to, the typical corporate code's
efforts at balancing the levers of shareholder initiative with board
authority over corporate affairs. The gap opened in the ability of the
board to manage the litigation is not trivial. To the contrary, it is
significant in light of the need for efficient means of ending lawsuits that
have some legal merit but will on balance bring more harm than benefit
to the corporation.
C.

A Note on the Significance of the Topic

The importance of finding socially useful pathways to terminate
derivative litigation depends on the degree of exposure of directors to
lawsuits for damages based on their conduct as directors. With
substantial permission given to corporations to eliminate liability for
directors in corporate chartering documents, the need for buttressing the
capacity of corporations to manage derivative litigation might be
questioned. 30 It is useful to consider the type of lawsuits to which
28. Id. at 1440 (commenting that settlement is the critical stage at which reforms
seem necessary and remarking on the legal profession's conservatism about reforms that
may affect its own interest).
29. The gap can be seen most sharply where indemnification is mandatory when
a director is successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of a suit. See, e.g., MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.52 (Supp. 1994). When combined with provisions
making indemnification and advancement of legal expenses mandatory, the gap in board
indemnification authority and the structuring of incentives in a manner compatible with
continued litigation without reference to a board best-interests determination may be
particularly hazardous to corporate best interests.
30. Butsee William T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship - A
Response to Professor Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate
Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107 (1993) (arguing that stockholders with specific
facts are able to prosecute effectively meritorious claims for breaches of duty of loyalty
in state courts); see also Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance;
Analysis of the American Law. Institute 's Principles of Corporate Governance:.
Recommendations and Analysis, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 468 n.27 (1992) (contrasting state
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directors remain exposed-i.e., suits with some merit even after liability
of directors has been substantially reduced under the statute-and to seek
indications of the volume of suits that appear to have some merit in the
existing regimes of liability.
A hypothetical may be useful. Assume a director named Harry in a
medium-sized corporation, Y Corporation. Harry is neither· the
paradigmatic predator nor the ideal disinterested director. He has
personal interests of various kinds that differ from the interests of the
shareholders. Harry has been an officer for several years, with a
comfortable compensation package that he could not readily replicate in
another job with another company. Harry also has financial interests in
entities, the affairs of which could become intertwined with those of Y
Corporation in various ways. Harry does not intend to bring active harm
to Y Corporation or to abandon its interests, but neither does he intend
to abandon his own interests. Harry has a healthy regard for his
personal well-being.
Harry is potentially capable of conduct that could give rise to a
meritorious claim of a violation of his duty of loyalty. Y Corporation
is publicly traded and thus a possible target for a takeover bid. Harry
is unlikely to see the business need for a change of control of Y
Corporation, whereby the entire management structure of the company
will be upended. Key operations of the company would be at risk of
relocation, creating damaging effects on local business.es in which Harry
is an investor. If a takeover bid should occur and fail as a result of
takeover defenses voted for by Harry, Harry may become a target of a
shareholder's derivative suit with some degree of merit. 31 Whether the
continuation of the suit is in the best interests of Y Corporation is a
matter that can be determined through litigation of a dismissal procedure,
or addressed in settlement discussions shaped· by the ability of Y
Corporation to extend an offer of indemnity to Harry for any monetary
settlement. 32

authorizations for corporation to relax duty of care standard with "rebuttable"
presumption in favor of the duty of loyalty and stating that no state permits limiting or
eliminating liability for loyalty violations, despite variations in formulation of exception
of duty of loyalty for authorization to eliminate liability).
31. See Ralph E. Jones, III & John P. Coonan, The Return on D & 0: Director
and Officers Insurance, 89 BEST'S REV., PROP. & CASUALTY INS. EDITION, Feb. 1989,
at 28 (asserting that entrenchment is a common allegation for which D & 0 insurance
is necessary).
32. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the effect of the formula to
award attorneys' fees on the need for a monetary judgment to justify such fees; even
without the preference of attorneys for awards of money damages to justify awards, the
logic of money damages would persist. The potential for damages is necessary for
deterrence; the assessment of money damages, even where the director is indemnified
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Harry may also be an active investor. This activity leaves Harry open
to possible second-guessing. Consider the following facts drawn loosely
from a reported case. 33
Corporation Y decides to acquire another corporation through the
purchase of preferred stock, which has voting rights attached to it. The
corporation acquires the preferred stock. When common stock becomes
available, the majority of the directors, including Harry, personally
acquire all the common stock that becomes available.
A stockholder brings a derivative suit, alleging misappropriation of a
corporate opportunity and self-dealing. Y Corporation appoints an SLC,
consisting of a distinguished former governor and university president,
who was also a board member at the time of the 'disputed transactions.
After investigation, the SLC concludes that Harry and the other
defendant directors acted in good faith and the suit should be dismissed.
The court concludes that the corporation has not carried its burden34 of
proving that the SLC was independent. Furthermore, the court finds that
the transaction is not protected by a finding that the directors acted in
good faith, because it is now subject to a standard of entire fairness due
to the SLC's lack of independence.
This is an example of a case with legal merit that, in a court's view,
must proceed. It confirms the fact that liability continues to exist,
despite statutory permission for corporate charters to eliminate considerable liability. This case also illustrates the risks, and the possible
ameliorating factors and benefits, attached to allowing boards to
indemnify directors for settlement of derivative suits.
Despite the considerable distinction of the board and the SLC, a court
would not conclude the suit is lacking in legal merit, that the SLC is
independent, and that the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. Yet the court is at pains to avoid suggesting that the SLC has any
other than good motives.
It is useful to consider the alternative routes the case might have taken
if the option of settling, with a grant of indemnification to the directors,
had been available. An obvious possibility is that the SLC would have

for the liability, constitutes symbolic condemnation that conveys symbolic information
about societal assessments of the director's conduct.
33. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied, 504 A.2d 571
(Del. 1986).
34. See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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settled the case and reimbursed the directors on the basis of the same
thinking that led it to recommend to the court that the case be dismissed.
Without being guilty of a corrupt motive, the SLC may have fallen into
flawed judgment, allowing its partiality to obscure the necessity of
looking with a skeptical eye on its own independence in addition to
assessing the corporation's best interests and the underlying legal
merits. 35
However, it is also possible that the risk of secondary liability for
wrongful indemnification, or reputational harm, would have altered the
SLC's deliberation, raising to the fore the issue of independence and
corporate best interests. If an SLC determined that ending the case·
without corporate recovery through the mechanism of indemnification of
settling directors was not justified, the SLC might well pause at
recommending dismissal to the court. Without an initial examination by
an SLC in possession of a conscience pricked by the moral weight of
acting as the decision-maker, rather than only as the legal proponent of
a motion to the court, the possibly mild embarrassment of having the
court disagree on dismissal may not weigh heavily on the SLC's mind.
After the exercise of moral responsibility associated with a full review
of corporate options for ending the litigation, a director of· the good
motives attributed to the above SLC might well doubt the ethics of
attempting to persuade the court to take an action which the SLC had
deemed personally unacceptable. 36 In the event that the board indemnified Harry and settled the case, when the court would have denied
dismissal, at least Harry must bear the onus of a home grown conclusion
that he has committed an actionable wrong. Indeed, the end result of a
refusal by the court or the board to end the case--without Harry in the
clear financially-may be a settlement funded by insurance. Such a
settlement is likely to be one drained of the internal moral assessment

35. It is worth considering whether boards might be encouraged to link the calculus
for determining the best interests of the corporation to their assessment of the legal
merits, which might argue for a generous assessment of the merits of the charges on the
grounds that corporate interests would be served by articulating strong standards for
directors' performance.
36. Of course, much of the reasoning will take place on the part of lawyers, who
present heavily digested recommendations to the board. In the review of options, the
lawyers too would have the experience of reviewing the possibility of having the board
take the direct route and appreciating the significance of any rejection of that option for
the propriety of the next option. Cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint
in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73
TEX. L. REV. 477, 523, 529-37 (1995) (arguing the legal constraints on corporations
encourage managers to abdicate moral responsibility, but applying the insight to .
proposals to broaden the corporate purpose to include ethical considerations as well as
profit and to take into account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies).

1078

[VOL. 32: 1063, 1995]

Neglected Policy Option
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that board-granted indemnification would encourage in the process of
conceding the legal wrong and terminating the litigation. Thus, while
no claim is made that a board termination by indemnification is superior
to the results of court mandated litigation, it is nonetheless not a total
wipeout for corporate accountability if a system of indemnification
creates the occasional result that the board terminates litigation that a
court would have permitted to continue.
If the facts of this case had been such that the court would have
granted dismissal, then the question is presented whether director
indemnification might be a more beneficial route to the same result. The
job of the SLC would be to focus not merely on legal doctrine but on
the best interests of the corporation. Arguably, and with greater
development of the practice of fashioning statements of a defensible
basis for settlement via indemnification, the best interests statement may
include a useful assessment of the flaws in conduct that should be
acknowledged in tandem with receipt by a director of indemnification.
That is, a more fine-grained analysis of the demerits of the conduct in
question could be encouraged as part of a resolution of charges designed
to serve the best interests of the corporation.
Rather than focusing exclusively on legal doctrines that might or
might not be a predicate for legal liability,37 the negotiations could
address in a prudential fashion the parties' assessment of the wisdom of
the transactions, given the legal standards, reputational considerations
and the business atmosphere surrounding the transaction. A far more
useful narrative of the transaction, and the lessons to take from it, might
well be garnered from an indemnified settlement than from a record of
court proceedings in which dismissal is granted. The court's primary
attention is to best interests, assuming the underlying legal merits. In
contrast, the corporation has an opportunity to create a document that
thoroughly dissects the business and ethical content of the conduct in
question. Indeed, a well disciplined process for creating an indemnified
settlement would encourage the corporate representatives to articulate the
strengths of the case against Harry and his colleagues to justify entering
into a settlement, rather than exclusively making the case against
liability. If associated with a requirement of disclosure and a set of
standards for the process that encouraged the type of reflection sought

37.

See Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967-69.
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in managerial audits, the result could be a brand of self-criticism more
productive of accountability and of guideposts for directors' conduct
than court-mandated dismissal of the lawsuit.
Despite the reduction of the total monetary exposure to which Harry
is potentially subject, it is clear that the opportunity and motives remain
for Harry to breach his director's duty by misappropriating from his
corporation. Thus, a constructive procedure for deterring Harry's bad
conduct and resolving charges that arise against Harry remains a topic
of importance in corporate law. For those cases in which the court
would grant dismissal, the procedure of indemnification-driven dismissal
provides the board with an opportunity to enhance the social good
attached to the termination of the lawsuit. For those cases in which the
court would deny dismissal, the procedure carries with it certain risks
that are arguably ameliorated by the addition of an option that focuses
the board's attention on whether the board could justify terminating the
suit without consulting the court. While the board may choose
improperly to indemnify and settle, it also may gain in moral insight
from the review of its options and thereby choose neither to settle nor
seek dismissal. In any event, the legal system tolerates some degree of
risk of "wrong" decisions (as discussed below).
Legal liability of directors remains. Within that zone of liability,
opportunities exist to increase the social usefulness of the process for
imposing, or foregoing the imposition of, such liability.

D.

The Need for Contextual Analysis and Policy Proposals

Given the nonempirical quality of the legal writing about indemnification and the significance of the gap in board authority, a framework for
empirical reasoning needs to be articulated. Among the analytic tasks
is to form hypotheses about the relationship between the options
available to boards to end derivative litigation and such unruly "realworld" phenomena as the amount purchased, terms, and cost of
directors' and officers' insurance. 38 The gap in board authority over

38. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to empirically explore the nuances
of the effect on the acquisition decision and the subset of questions about the interaction
among the insured, the board, and the insurance company in an instance of covered
litigation, it appears reasonable to hypothesize that the modes of disposition available
have an effect on the patterns of purchase of insurance and the leverage between the
parties when coverage comes into play.
While seven states now allow indemnification of settlement amounts, the lore
surrounding the business practice of executive risk protection draws heavily upon the
visibility of Delaware law, which omits to authorize indemnification of settlement
amounts and substantially affects the standard national practice of building protection for
directors in the event of lawsuits against them. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974).
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litigation may have some degree of effect on the patterns of risk
coverage thought necessary, perhaps largely from habits brought about
by the "grid" of protection available to directors. 39 At a minimum, it
may be hypothesized that the inability of boards to indemnify settlement
amounts is an important factor in the practice of corporations to bear the
cost of (lightly regulated)40 insurance coverage41 and participate in
settlement negotiations driven substantially by a "repeat player."42 This
repeat player, the underwriter of executive risk insurance, brings
sophistication, experience, and situational leverage43 that gives it the
preeminent role in managing most specific occurrences of derivative
litigation. While the repeat player may arguably bring benefits to the
process of litigation, such as acting as the de facto manager of corporate
litigation and funding recoveries for the corporation as the actual
derivative plaintiff, it also: (a) allocates influence over decision-making
about corporate affairs to a corporate outsider; (b) (by creating an
incentive to rely on insurance)44 imposes an overall system

Thus, even though some states might theoretically be "laboratories of experimentation,"
, it may be that there is no critical mass of corporate players who have considered the
possibility of altering standard practice based on the potential impact of a differing state
law.
39. Id.; cf Paul Sweeney, Full Siege Ahead, ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov.-Dec. 1994,
at 34 (suggesting that insurance coverage affects litigation decisions); infra text
accompanying notes 226-27.
40. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 259 ("Unfortunately, corporate policyholders
cannot look to state insurance regulators for protection.") (citing Jon Harkavy, Protecting
Buyers' Needs; State Regulators Must Give Policy Form Changes Greater Scrutiny, Bus.
INS., July 20, 1992, at 19 ("[T]he commercial insurance consumer is little more than an
afterthought to a state regulator....")).
41. See Leo Herzel, Law Should Allow Indemnity for Derivative Suits, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1986, at 11 (asserting that, with statutory permission to indemnify
directors for settlement payments, companies would only need to provide directors with
insurance in case of insolvency).
42. Given the prevalence of settlements, it has been said that the "strategic position
of repeat players" in securities litigation is the primary factor in settlements, rather than
legal standards. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Symposium on Civil Justice Reform:
"Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339, 1385 n.208 (1994) (citing Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 566 (1991)).
43. Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 288 (describing typical liability insurance
policies for corporations as contracts of adhesion sold to policyholders on a "take-it-orleave-it" basis).
44. See Herzel, supra note 41, at 11 (arguing that directors ·prefer indemnification
to insurance coverage but must have insurance because the risk of a derivative suit
recovery by the corporation against the director is unindemnifiable).
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cost----corporate insurance premiums--that creates a break-even effect,
given investor diversification,45 less justified by loss spreading46 than
in casualty coverage; and (c) invites litigation that targets the insurance
fund because of the practicality of bringing a cash payment to a
corporation's treasury without the counter-intuitive "wash" that
indemnification represents on a case-by-case basis.
The plausibility of such linkage is supported by the behavior of one
chief executive officer who has strikingly embraced an empirical
hypothesis about the effect of insurance on corporate litigation by
adopting a "go naked" policy of refusing to purchase insurance that pays
directors and officers in the event of suit.47 Further indication that
outside repeat players are not ideal solutions in the mind of the corporate
world are recent movements to allow a greater freedom for corporations
to self-insure48 directors and officers--a movement with the probable
effect of aligning more closely the interests of the corporation, the
defendant, and the insuring group. 49
Thus, assessing the gap and deciding whether the legal system's usual
reaction to a gap-"fill it"-is in order requires a look at the entire
context of derivative litigation in which indemnification occurs. A
critical component is a device that has enabled boards to recapture the
initiative in derivative litigation, after being for a time stymied by the
legal system's view that a board whose members had been sued could
not play a significant role in resolving the suit. The law accords a large
measure of deference to this device, known as the special litigation
committee, or "SLC," described below. 50 The SLC has functioned in
many instances to restore a measure of control over corporate derivative
litigation to the boards of corporations. It is all the more striking, then,
in evaluating the context surrounding the function indemnification might
play, that the technical success of the SLC at enabling the corporation

45. Cf Winter, supra note 4 at 948 (diversified investors' losses in one company
matched by gains in companies that receive damages payments).
46. Id. at 951 (settlements funded by insurance, if viewed in the aggregate, do not
yield investors any return over premiums paid).
47. Sweeney, supra note 39, at 30.
48. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 1091-92 (noting "substantial number of
jurisdictions" authorizing alternatives to D & 0 insurance such as self-insurance).
49. While such a move may primarily reflect a concern for "hostile indemnification" situations after a change of control, it nonetheless is a solution to the problems
presented above--the pre-eminence in the particular lawsuit of a repeat player that is
alien to the interests of the corporation and the intuitive rejection of circular movement
of money from the defendant to the corporate treasury and back again. But see id. at
1092 (noting rejection by Delaware of self-insurance on the grounds that it is
"fundamentally circular").
50. See infra text accompanying notes 160-62.
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to end litigation does not bring about complacency by commentators
satisfied with the SLC as a significant factor in disciplining derivative
litigation. Indeed, the· SLC device enjoys individual case applications
during a time of substantial growth of anti-corporate-litigation sentiment
and policy. 51
Evaluating, endorsing, or criticizing the SLC is not a goal of this
Article. Despite reservations expressed frontally by skeptical scholars52
and indirectly by judges calibrating the details of the accepted legal
approach, 53 the ability of corporations to end derivative litigation with
.the assistance of the SLC has reached that state of affairs in which a
legal practice or rule has moved outside the arena 'of practical dispute.
Nothing that is written about SLCs has a prospect of ousting them from
the arsenal of corporate defenses against derivative litigation, absent a
movement to fundamentally reorder the mechanisms by which corporations are held accountable to shareholders54 or, more implausibly in the
current political climate, to create corporate accountability to nonshareholder constituencies.
E.

Contemporary Policy Currents

The current policy context, to the contrary, is one fraught with
reactivity to perceived negative features of shareholder litigation-the
circulation of proposals and rhetoric aimed at disabling the mechanisms
of shareholder litigation more radically, rather than by strengthening the
authority of boards of directors to inanage it in the interests of the
corporation. Among the stronger proposals that have been in circulation
is one to shift fees in private securities actions. A requirement of higher

51. See supra note 9; infra text accompanying notes 55-63; see also Dooley &
Veasey, supra note 7, at 514 (stating that the premise of the ALI reporters in 1988 seems
to be that there was too little derivative litigation).
52. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1424 (describing liberal scholars' citation of
evidence that SLCs almost invariably recommend dismissal of derivative suits). But see
Quillen, supra note 30, at 124 (claiming that SLCs have fallen into disuse since Lewis
v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied, 504 A.2d 571 (Del. 1986),
given the risk that SLC findings will become a blueprint to prosecution of the suit); infra
text accompanying note 212.
53. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (business judgment rule
does not apply when SLC recommends dismissal of a suit), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
54. See Winter, supra note 4, at 952 (proposing appointment of a special master
with authority to terminate derivative suits).
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proof and pleading requirements for securities actions was enacted by
Congress over President Clinton's objection. 55 The latter policy
initiatives, while not frontally aimed at derivative litigation,56 reflect an
approach to the reform of corporate litigation that avoids tinkering with
the ground rules of corporate governance. Also, the approach nominally
leaves intact the general duties of boards to act lawfully, but prunes
away doctrines of law and long-standing practices that enable plaintiffs
to hire lawyers and offer proofs. 57
A negative view of corporate settlements of litigation is at the
forefront of the current policy thinking. In other contexts, settlement is
the mythical cure all for excesses of litigation, but not in corporate
matters. The few reported empirical :findings, given their rarity in legal
writing, have assumed totemic significance: the finding by Janet Cooper
Alexander that corporate litigation is settled without reference to the
merits58 is taken as a last word sort of :finding. Alexander demonstrates
on a "need we say more basis" that corporate litigation and settlement
is a corrupt and damaging process, inflicting untold waste on corporate
America59 and emanating from opportunistic individual investors
unconcerned with collective interests who are represented by attorneys

55. See supra note 9.
56. Derivative Litigation is not, in the usual instance, federal securities litigation.
Securities litigation is typically litigated as a class action. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra
note 26, at 747 (referring, in context of securities litigation policy proposals, to the issue
of "private class action securities litigation."); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that breach of state law fiduciary duty, in absence of
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, does not violate Rule I 0b-5).
57. Even before the introduction of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995,
the director of the Enforcement Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
William McLucas warned, "[L]itigation reform should seek to eliminate frivolous claims
and abusive litigation without diluting the effectiveness of private remedies against
fraud." Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1993) [hereinafter McLucas Statement] (statement of William R.
McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC).
58. Alexander, supra note 8, at 567. Citations to the Alexander piece proliferate
with vigor in textbooks, scholarship, and judicial opinions. See, e.g., Winter, supra note
4, at 949-51; Bell At!. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993).
The near universal approbation of the finding-and its implications-has been
moderated by the recent exchange between Professors Grundfest and Seligman. See
Seligman, supra note 26; Grundfest, supra note 26.
59. Sweeney, supra note 39, at 6 (quoting Intel general counsel on the cost of
disposing of a frivolous suit "that $500,000 could have supported another, say, 10
production workers. We could have had engineers designing products."); cf McLucas
Statement, supra note 57, at 118 ("[M]ost judges believe that groundless litigation
presents only a small problem on their dockets.").
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prepared to file computer-stored pleadings virtually without effort. 60
The prevailing portrait does not lack for human interest, carrying with
it the image of well-intended executives subjected to a harrowing
onslaught of litigation as repayment for their service to the investing
public. 61 Thus, far from being a target of critical scrutiny, the SLC is
simply one device in the growing arsenal of weapons being developed
by the legal system to allow corporate boards to reduce the threat of
derivative litigation. The moral onus of the perceived shortcomings of
derivative litigation comes to bear mainly on the reputation of the
proponents of the litigation rather than either the targets or the context
created by overall assumptions and policy. 62 Yet the moral climate of
derivative litigation is a social product of a collaboration in ways of
doing business of all who participate-Code writers, the corporate bar,
plaintiff's lawyers, directors, management, plaintiffs, investors, and legal
commentators. If suits are brought and settled on grounds other than
merit, it may suggest, not the need for noncontextual, technical tinkering
mainly aimed at lawyers' incentives, but a direct concern with the
socially created moral climate in which settlements are felt to arise from
an impaired process of bargaining among improperly motivated
players. 63
What might be useful in the current policy context is to demonstrate,
as has not been done previously, the logical nexus between the
(relatively) uncontroversial judicial and statutory practice of allowing
SLCs to terminate shareholder suits by moving to dismiss them, and the
generally rejected but, as this Article argues, parallel alternative of
allowing SLCs to terminate such suits by indemnifying settling directors.
The logical connection, not recognized, between the two types of SLC

60. See Cordtz & Reingold, supra note 4, at 24 ("All the elements are in place:
assertive investors, a small army of sophisticated class action attorneys and a slew of idle
computers.").
61. See id. at 23-25. A Louis Harris poll indicates that half of all outside directors
have already been sued at least once in connection with their board service. Worries of
directors increased in 1991 when a jury imposed $100 million fraud penalty on two
Apple directors in a weak case. Id.
62. Interestingly, solicitude for corporate executives is high at a time when public
officials face an increasing level of scrutiny demanded by the voting public.
63. Bell At!. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting appeal
of settlement of derivative action settlement because of risk that "[p]laintiffs' attorneys
and the defendants may settle in a manner adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs by
exchanging a low settlement for high fees").
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action is that the latter is simply another route to terminate cases, the
same activity in which the SLC engages when it provides the grounds
for a successful motion by the corporation to dismiss a derivative suit.64
The usual arguments against the extension of the SLC's authority to
terminate cases by settlement backed by indemnification of directors do
not hold up well to critical scrutiny. 65
Their vulnerability to attack by logic may or may not call for a
rehabilitation of their object or its configuration as a critical element in
the policy response to the perceived shortcomings of derivative litigation.
Nonetheless, the relative unpersuasiveness of the received wisdom,
combined with the flaws in the general conception of the policy context
of thinking about derivative litigation, suggests the merits of greater
attention to the possible strengths of the processes that might encourage
the oft-maligned outcome of derivative suit settlements. Although
comparing the SLC role in the accepted mode of termination with its
possible role in the alternative of indemnification of directors yields
some arguable comparative weaknesses, especially the absence of
immediate judicial review of an adversarially litigated matter,66 it also
yields arguable comparative strengths---the moral accountability and (at
least nominal) legal liability67 of the board for an action that was not
blessed by immediate judicial review. 68
This Article, then, contains something for the proponent, and
something for the critic, of the SLC role in terminating derivative
litigation. Either is invited to reflect upon the insights located in this
unexplored area of the close relationship of the SLC to a neglected
pathway to termination of derivative litigation. The proponent may
decide that indemnification of settlements---"filling the gap"-is
advisable, or that, for new and different reasons, the alternative should
continue to be rejected. The critic may regard the tightness of the
connection-and the relentless quality of the arguments presented below
for recognizing extending the logic of that connection as grounds not
merely for adopting the view that the extension is not necessary but for
pressing for a reconsideration of the accepted learning.

64. Oblique recognition occurs in occasional judicial references to the similarity.
See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (stating that there is
"some analogy to a settlement in that there is a request to terminate litigation without
a judicial termination of the merits").
65. See infra text accompanying notes 187-221.
66. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. But see infra note 212
(concerning deficiencies of SLC discovery and advocacy).
67. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (secondary liability).
68. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
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The reformer, neither of the state of mind of the determined skeptic
nor the Babbitesque proponent, may see the restatement of the question
as one that invites a more nuanced consideration of the possibilities for
fine-tuning the mechanism of derivative litigation rather than making
wholesale decisions about its vitality. The opportunity arises to consider
reasonable arguments for and against enhancing SLC roles in terminating
litigation and to review the learning and the existing mechanisms for
managing shareholder litigation. 69 Such a review would be in search
of policy responses to shareholder litigation sensitive to the pro's and
con's of allowing the corporation to end such litigation by either of the
methods--litigated dismissal or negotiated termination--rather than
shaped more bluntly by choices of starkly differing perspectives on the
social usefulness of shareholder litigation. 70

II.

A

NOTE

ON ANALYSIS

The analytic background to assessment of the gap in board authority
arises from conceptual points about the function of doctrines of liability,
compared with rules of financial exoneration of settling directors, general
litigation-efficiency thinking about dispute processing, other corporate
law doctrines that deflect punishment from directors for conduct
deserving of some degree of moral disapprobation or deterrence, and of
the evolution of corporate governance under the influence of reform
proposals intended to soften the effect of board self-perpetuation.

A.
1.

Doctrines of Liability and Indemnity

Need for and Primary Source of Doctrines Protecting Directors
from Draconian Liability

Shielding directors from liability has an animating purpose of
"fairness" to directors as a practical necessity for efficient delegation of
tasks to them as agents. By hypothesis, corporations benefit from legal

69. See Winter, supra note 4, at 949 (suggesting that existing procedures for
derivative and class actions diminish return on capital).
70. Cf Grundfest, supra note 26, at 742 (arguing for more "textured" conclusion
in debate on whether merits matter in which policy strategies are sought to filter out
weaker claims earlier in process while allowing more meritorious claims to proceed).
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doctrines tthat protect their agents from bearing the risk associated with
the corporations' profit generating activities. Agency doctrine, as
utilized in the public corporation, attempts to assign risk of business loss
to more efficient risk bearers and away from less efficient risk bearers. 71 In the corporate context, this is conceived as shifting risk away
from directors and managers for corporate losses on sub-maximal
transactions toward the more efficient risk bearers-the corporate
owners, i.e., the shareholders. 72 Corporate costs commonly cited as
being associated with incorrectly assigning losses to managers (not
including the costs of the litigation itself) are discouragement of risktaking by corporate managers73 and harm to recruitment of competent
corporate directors. 74 If directors faced a high probability of being
required to fund corporate business losses, competent individuals would
not serve. If they served, they would only pursue low risk projects.
Patently, indemnification (at least so far as indemnification for
amounts paid to satisfy claims) does not serve as the primary safeguard
against legal liability so draconian that rational persons would refuse to
serve as directors. The principal safeguard is the rationality and
reasonableness of the doctrines that impose liability on directors for
business failure-the known tendency of the doctrines to 75 serve
primarily as aspirational statements for good conduct and to set the
outside limits of nonfeasance, 76 or malfeasance. 77 The major work of
safeguarding directors' interests so as to encourage service and risktaking is done by the liability doctrines themselves-not by the rules of
indemnification. 78

71. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL
L. REV.' 261 (1986) (describing shareholders as more efficient risk bearers than
managers, with citations to agency doctrine).
72. Id. at 285 (asserting that public corporations transfer most risk to security
holders because of their comparative advantage in bearing risk).
73. Id. at 265.
74. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 943.
75. Dooley, supra note 30, at 502 (suggesting that lack of cases holding directors
liable for negligence means articulation of duty of care is intended as mostly hortatory).
76. Id. at 503.
77. Id. at 506.
78. Nonetheless, much rhetoric about indemnification and about insurance comes
to rest upon the claim that indemnification and insurance are necessities to ensure the
willingness of directors to serve. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 943. The result is to
place undue emphasis on indemnification as a component of director welfare rather than
a tool for corporate decision-making about litigation.
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2.

Role of Indemnification in Director Protection

The exception to the marginality of indemnification as director
protection is indemnification for the costs of defending suits. The
common law contains the concept in its purest form: agents are entitled
to be paid the expenses of their defense against a baseless suit brought
because of acts they performed for their principal. 79 While the liability
doctrine ultimately is a sufficient protection against the substantive
claim, the American rule on fees exposes agents to an intolerable risk of
incurring transaction costs to receive the vindication to which they are
entitled.so Common law courts and authoritative legal summaries
conclude that agents are entitled to indemnification for expenses (and for
judgments) in the absence of an agreement to the contrary where their
conduct is blameless.s 1 The degree of protection for the legal defense
of conduct that is not clearly blameless is a matter that can be adjusted
by negotiation between the principal and the agent as part of the
understanding concerning compensation. An agreement to compensate
is not lightly implied in the absence of express agreement, so the
contours of indemnity is a natural subject for express agreement.
However, between an agent and a principal which is a natural person,
indemnity for breach of duty to the principal-protection for blameworthy conduct-is equivalent to waiver or elimination of liability since the
principal would exercise considerable caution in suing over a matter for
which an indemnity has been extended. There is no equivalent of the
corporate problem of lawsuits launched by a representative of the
principal against the agent despite an agreement of indemnity (or of
elimination ofliability). Similarly, advance promises by a natural person
to indemnify an agent against third party judgments for negligence run
entirely to the benefit of the agent, since an individual can decide at any
time to exonerate an agent (with the agent's leave). There is no need for
enforceable agreements that permit the use of the principal's assets for
agent exoneration, since the principal has unrestricted freedom to settle
and indemnify in accordance with a cost-benefit judgment relating to the
merits of a lawsuit. Thus, indemnity between private individuals is very

79.
80.
81.

Admiral Orient Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936).

See Sweeney, supra note 39, at 6.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 438-40, 458 (1957).
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much a matter of inducements to serve and of compensation. The entire
subject is one guided by the agent's interests and the pricing between the
principal and agent of the probability of faithless or negligent conduct
by the agent. Pricing of the riskiness of the transaction can be calibrated
to fit the exact agency, thus enabling private principals and agents to
strike bargains they see as fair. 82
2

3.

Limitations on Negotiated Express Agreements for Indemnity

Complications arise where the principal is a legal entity owned by
dispersed shareholders. The corporation's promise of indemnity is not
equivalent to a promise by shareholders not to sue. 83 · While the
compensation problem for the agent is the same as with a private
principal, the agent (the director) and the shareholder are not able to
participate in the making of an express agreement concerning the
contours of indemnification outside of the automatic common law
protection for conduct in which an agent is sued for doing exactly the
bidding of his principal. Thus, promises of indemnity are not equivalent
to a waiver of liability tailored to the characteristic risks of the particular
agency, but instead are standard forms made available to the corporate
community and adopted by the corporation as a representative of the
interests of both the agent (director) and the business entity with the proforma approval of the principals (shareholders). At a minimum, the
compunction not to sue does not exist. The availability of indemnification through the corporation as principal does not answer the question
of the propriety of a suit by the dispersed owners.
The predictability of suits where the agent has sought to preclude them
does not undercut the general point that substantial agent protection from
bearing the cost of business losses derives from reasonable doctrines of
liability. Despite the fundamental fact that the American legal system
ranks as rational, costly litigation between the principal and the agent is
82. A similar point has been made in the partnership context. See Larry E.
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus.
LAW. 45, 54 (1993).
Partners often do not contract to be strict fiduciaries in the typical agency or
trust sense of one who controls the property of another. In other words,
partners are not necessarily comparable to directors or executives of publicly
held corporations. Instead, partners may be self-seeking co-venturers who are
constrained from the worst kinds of misconduct by their contingent compensation, personal liability for debts, and their co-partners' close monitoring and
power to withdraw at any time.
Id.
83. Cf Dooley, supra note 30, at 492 n.109 (contrasting closely held corporations,
in which all adaptive decisions are made by the residual claimants, with publicly held
corporations).
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a business problem for corporations. The substantive doctrines of
liability cannot be so sensitively calibrated that they prospectively locate
for each instance of disputed director behavior the efficient break-point
between avoiding a monetary penalty for well-intentioned but legally
vulnerable conduct and extracting a penalty for conduct so blameworthy
that its cost should fall on the agent rather than the dispersed shareholders. The resulting problem is not primarily one of undue director
exposure to litigation and possible inefficient cost shifting of losses to
directors and thus disincentives to service, but of litigation conducted
with insufficient attention to the interests of a corporation. Thus,
indemnification should be considered with primary attention to the
business needs of corporations in the management of litigation and the
possibilities for influencing the moral climate in. which these business
needs are attended. to.

4.

The Separate Domains of the Law s Search for Efficient Solutions

While much writing laments the plight of directors,84 concern for
fairness for directors in the moral sense of just deserts is not the
underlying rationale for. schemes of liability and indemnity. The search
is, or should be, 85 for doctrines that allocate losses efficiently between
directors and shareholders. Unsatisfactory results would take the form
of uncompensated losses falling on agents or, contrariwise, the costs of
faithless conduct being assigned to the shareholders. Policy choices to
avert such results involve the search for a workable standard of liability
for corporate agents86 and efficient processes and substantive rules for
indemnification. 87
·

84. E.g., Cordtz & Reingold, supra note 4, at 22-25 (asserting that hostile climate
makes service of corporate boards unpopular).
85. Alex Elson & Michael L. Shakman, The ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 Bus. LAW. 1761 (1994)
(arguing that the ALI Principles were unduly influenced by lawyers representing the
interests of corporate management).
86. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1498 (duty of care); Dooley, supra note 30,
at 486 n.27 (discussing duty of care and limitation of liability respectively).
87. Whatever the specific contours of statutory permissions to indemnify for types
of obligations incurred, statutes consistently impose a standard of conduct that a director
must be found to have met in order to be eligible for indemnification of any expense at
all. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.51. The Act sets the following
minimum standards:
(I) (i) he conducted himself in good faith; and
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The attempt of the legal system to reach efficient solutions has
resulted in a slicing up of doctrine and process into separate domains.
These are: (1) the articulated· rules of director conduct; 88 (2) the
standard of monetary liability to which the law in fact subjects directors
for breaches of the rules of conduct; 89 (3) the exoneration by the
corporation (acting through the board) of the director for monetary
liability imposed under the liability standard; 90 (4) the exoneration by
a court of the director for monetary liability imposed under the liability
standard; 91 (5) the standards for the insuring of directors by an outside
insurance company; 92 and (6) the rules for exoneration of the director
by corporate self-insurance. 93 The standard of liability once was coextensive with the articulation of the standards imposed by law on
corporate directors. 94 With the enactment of section 141(:t) of the
Delaware Code95 and section 2.02(b)(4) of the Model Act,96 the
articulation of the standards became separate from the regime of
liability. 97 The recent work in the Model Act has moved the law of

(ii) he reasonably believed;
(A) in the case of conduct in his official capacity, that the conduct was in
the best interests of the corporation; and
(B) in all other cases, that his conduct was at least not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation; or
(2) he engaged in conduct for which broader indemnification has been made
permissible or obligatory under a provision of the articles of incorporation
(as authorized by § 2.02(b)(5)).
88. See Dooley, supra note 30.
89. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note I, at 741 (Model Act provision
permitting articles of incorporations provisions eliminating or limiting director liability).
90. See id. at 749 (indemnification discussion).
91. See id. at 768-71 (setting forth and discussing provision for court-ordered
indemnification).
92. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 994-96 (discussing limits of insurance
coverage of directors, officers and employees).
93. See id. at 1089-97 (discussing "captive" insurance subsidiary arrangements).
94. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1478, 1498 (arguing, prior to enactment of
statutes permitting liability limitation, that duty of care articulation was unrealistic and
should be reworked).
95. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(f) (1991).
96. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02 (b)(4) (3d ed. 1994).
97. While § 14l(f) and § 2.02(b)(4) only permit the insertion into articles of
limitation of liability provisions, as a practical matter, all public corporations will limit
liability. See JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (1995)
(over 90 percent of a random sample of 180 Delaware firms adopted a limited liability
approach within one year of the enactment of Delaware's limitation of liability
provision). Compare Quillen, supra note 30, at 119 (suggesting that requirement of
shareholder vote to enact § I 02(b)(7) provision militates against dilution of standard and
arguing that§ 102(b)(7) emphasizes enforcement of duty of care at injunction stage).
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liability forcefully toward substantial curtailment of liability for the
conduct of directors other than for acts of defalcation. 98

5.

The Inevitable Persistence of "Extra" Liability

Despite the breakthroughs of the proponents of a smaller sphere of
liability for corporate agents, some unpredictable amount of liability will
persist. Judges must interpret phrases that preserve liability for such
conduct as "receipt of financial benefit to which [a director] is not
entitled" and "an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation.
" 99
Moreover, despite the political clout 100 today of the forces
that oppose the use of legal proceedings as a club to deter director
misconduct, 101 the boundaries of legal liability will predictably shift
with the ebb and flow of political forces and judicial opinion. 102
However much corporate codes may trim director liability under the
influence of the corporate bar, the complications associated with solving
the borderline cases where liability rules do not deflect actions that have
legal merit, but may not justify cost shifting, will remain 103-to be
addressed by doctrines of indemnity. Indeed, indemnity is the play in
the joints of legal liability-the permission for reasoned judgment by
individuals to overcome the woodenness of legal doctrine.
The effort to protect the corporation from bearing the cost of faithless
conduct by agents while also protecting agents through either mandating

98. See Dooley, supra note 30.
99. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4)(A), (B) (3d ed. 1994).
I 00. See Elson & Shakman, supra note 85, at 1764 (influence of management view
in ALI Principles published in 1994).
101. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1428 (describing real benefit of derivative
litigation as deterrence, not financial recovery).
102. Judge Ralph Winter, whose concern about the effect of corporate litigation on
capital formation, see Winter, supra note 4, at 948-49, has become a prominent citation
in the anti-corporate litigation commentary (despite the balance suggested by the portion
of the article's title referring to "protecting managers"), even to the extent of being cited
by the Supreme Court in the course of trimming the amount of liability under the
Securities Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5, see SELIGMAN, supra note 97, at 1433, nonetheless
held in a leading case on SLCs that the SLC was not entitled to the benefit of the
business judgment rule in a motion_ to dismiss, because leaving the decision on
enforcement of fiduciary duties to the defendants' appointees would eliminate fiduciary
duties of directors and officers. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
103. See, e.g., Jones & Coonan, supra note 31, at 30 (referring, following first wave
of limitation of liability statutes, to "formidable list of leftover liability exposures").
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or permitting indemnification thus can be seen to result in a disjunction
of legal standards, one protective of the corporation and one protective
of the agent. The standard for legal liability of directors is inclusive of
director misconduct that is also included within the category of conduct
eligible for indemnification. That is, the standard for indemnifying
directors is more liberal to directors· than is the standard for assessing
legal liability. 104 The creation of the more liberal standard means that
the legal system has in some sense, more or less direct, acknowledged
that the standard for director's liability for breaches of duty is
overinclusive. 105 The category of director liability picks up breaches
of duty that do not demand a redistribution of entitlements from ,the
director to the corporation, or, that, in any event, are consistent with
distributing transaction costs from the corporation to the director. 106
The standard to indemnify the director is more liberal, because it is
conceived of as making available the ideal distributional solution
following the nominal (or actual) 107 imposition of a corrective statement to a breaching director.

104. The standard is more liberal both with respect to indemnification of legal costs
(where indemnification of liability amounts is precluded) and with respect to
indemnification of settlement amounts. In both cases, the general point holds that legal
doctrine acknowledges a disjunction between the goods of assessing liability as a
symbolic corrective for agency failings and distributing costs between the agent and the
principal.
It is noteworthy that the Model Act expressly allows indemnification for legal
expenses for the exact conduct for which liability has been eliminated, see MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.5l(a)(2) (citing § 2.02(b)(5)), and expressly, in the
alternative, allows indemnification based upon a finding that the director was acting in
the reasonable belief, in the case of conduct in his official capacity, that his conduct was
in the best interests of the .corporation and, in all other cases, that his conduct was at
least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. See id. § 8.51(a)(l)(ii)(A), (B).
Thus, the Model Act cleanly segregates a category of indemnification that addresses
conduct not eligible for elimination of liability.
105. In the context of master-servant law, the argument has been made that servants
should not bear the loss by way of indemnity to the master for their negligence when
they have accidents in the course of working for the master, since such accidents can be
considered "mere inadvertence" and are foreseeable results of a servant's working for
the master. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 488 P.2d 429, 432-35 (Or.
1971) (rejecting argument on ground that tort law requires that all persons be held
responsible for the consequences of their wrongful acts). The Turner case is cited in J.
DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 229-30
(1994).
106. "Legal remedies are sought to overcome a present distribution that is out of
line with the parties' claimed entitlements." Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1364.
Note that, as discussed supra note 104, even where the indemnification only covers legal
costs, the existence of one standard imposing liability and the other redistributing legal
costs from the recovering corporation to the breaching agent reveals a disjunction in the
assessment of the agent's culpability.
107. See supra note 104.
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6.

The Reason for "Extra" Liability

What good is produced by imposing legal liability that is promptly
canceled by the regime of indemnity? The obvious candidates are:
deterrence of misconduct by imposing overinclusive categories of
liability; 108 the educative function of applying corporate legal doctrines to novel directorial conflicts of interest; and the function of
enlarging the "shadow of the law" 109 effect on bargaining by agents
concetning structural solutions to alleged conflicts of interest. The
potential effect of the regime is to impose stigma, for which no
indemnity is possible.
The substantive doctrines of corporate cost allocation between agents
and corporations, then, strive for a statement of the ideal distributional
solution between directors and shareholders in terms of symbols and
resources. If these could be imposed with complete accuracy by cost
free decision-making, the system would attain the ideal results - deterrence, education, and innovation combined with the correct
distribution of business losses. Given the impossibility of achieving
perfect accuracy in decision-making, the system, in substance, tolerates
the risk that imposition of liability or provision of indemnity will be
over-applied or under-applied. The system distributes the risk of
misapplication between two regimes of authoritative decision-making,
one associated with liability imposition and one associated with
indemnity decisions. In addition, the system tolerates the risk that
striving for "deterrence"-stated positively, encouraging responsibility' 10-will impose costs in individual instances that exceed the recovery to the corporation. 111

108. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1428-29 (discussing the deterrence effect of cases
that do not yield a positive net recovery).
.
109. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1349 (citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 959-77 (1979)).
110. See Dooley, supra note 30, at 463 (describing governance aspects of ALI
Principles designed to promote "Responsibility," in contrast with "Authority").
111. Coffee, supra note 6, at 1428-29 (suggesting that benefit of derivative action
more likely lies in deterrence than in financial recovery generated); see also id. at 143637 (comparing inability to measure deterrence in derivative suits to criminal law enforcement).
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B.

Indemnification of Settlement Amounts as a Mode of Case
Disposition

The risk of inaccurate decisions about liability is primarily located in
the adjudicative function, while the risk of inaccurate decisions about
indemnity (or self-insurance payments) is primarily located in the
function of private decision-making in the shadow of the law. 112 Any
assessment of these relative risks should be made in light of a conceptual
shift from a focus on the risks of inaccurate indemnification decisions
(or, indeed, the incongruous results of accurate decisions) 113 and
toward a vision of indemnification of directors for settlement amounts
as an alternative mode of disposing of derivative litigation on par with
a motion to dismiss. 114 While indemnification of directors for settlement amounts has the effect of shielding directors at the margin from an
inappropriate shifting of costs from the principal (the group of shareholders) to the agent (the defendant directors), it also can be thought of
as a choice in the array of litigation-ending methods available in a legal
system. Indemnification of directors for settlement amounts can be seen
as a dispute resolution doctrine as well as an allocation of substantive
entitlements and examined as a technique, with incidental allocative
effects, of dispute resolution. As discussed below, settlements arise from
factors created by legal doctrines and occurring in processes presided
over by courts from close range or at a distance. 115 They are not a
"stray byproduct of the judicial process" 116 but a set of results brought
about by policies chosen and administered by the legal system.
C.

Indemnification of Directors for Settlement Amounts
As a Pro-Settlement Policy

The third conceptual point concerns the fact that permitting boards to
indemnify directors for payment of settlement amounts should generate
more settlements, or, in any event, alter the timing of settlements. It is,
as suggested above and described below, a pro-settlement policy. The
policy is not merely an allocational decision relating to substantive
entitlements, but an alteration of the probable modes of generating
dispositions of derivative suits. Such alteration will affect: (1) the
transaction costs; (2) the nearness to which the distribution of substan112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1349.
See infra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1390-91, quoted infra note 175.
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tive entitlements approaches the "correct" distribution of substantive
entitlem.ents; 117 and (3) the social goods lost or gained by substituting
settlement for litigation. 118

1.

Assessment

Assessment of the statutory choice of allowing corporations to
indemnify settlements requires som.e consideration of the need for, and
the functioning of, settlement as a m.ode of ending derivative litigation.
The first, the need for settlement, is implied by the comm.on conclusion
by legal writers that corporate litigation imposes m.ore costs on
corporations than it provides recovery or prevention of losses, at least for
individual corporations m.ade the subject of litigation. 119 It has been
argued at a system. level that various factors combine to m.ake derivative
litigation (and class actions by shareholders) a net drain on corporate
assets, thereby "substantially dim.inish[ing] the return to American
investors in American com.panies." 120 Specific costs associated with
derivative litigation are the cost, substantially borne by corporations, of
defending directors and officers from. allocation to them. of losses
correctly 121 borne by the corporate owners 122 and the costs of liability insurance and various types of opportunity costs to the corporation of
involvement in litigation. The starkest statement that derivative suits are
117. See id. at 1360-64 (discussing use of "legal remedies to overcome a present
distribution that is out of line with parties' claimed entitlements").
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in
Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436, 1473 & n.169 (1994) (noting that
"most derivative actions end not in litigation but in settlement," and arguing that
"[s]ettlements, like derivative actions pursued to judgment, often result in a bounty to
the attorney, yet little gain to the shareholder"); see also Winter, supra note 4, at 952
(asserting that in most derivative and class action suits the corporation receives no
benefit but pays everyone's legal fees).
120. Winter, supra note 4, at 949. The evidence cited by Winter does not really
support the proposition except in the most indirect way. Id. at 949 n.9 (citing article that
concludes that "many [class and derivative] suits result in settlements that benefit[] the
attorneys more than the shareholders").
121. It should be noted that some costs of defense are borne by the corporation even
if the director may be said "correctly" to bear a loss.
122. See Ronald A. Dabrowski, Note, Proportionate Liability in J0b-5 Reckless
Fraud Cases, 44 DUKE L.J. 575, 576 (1994) (costs of defending § l0b-5 private causes
of action are broad, ranging from direct costs of legal expenses and damages to indirect
costs of higher insurance premiums and reputational harm); see also BLOCK ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 942.
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not net gainers for corporations comes in the suggestion of viewing in
the aggregate the payment of settlement amounts and litigation costs
through funding by insurance paid for by the corporation; premiums paid
by all corporations should be equivalent to amounts recovered. 123
2.

The Anti-Settlement Tone of Writing about Corporate
Litigation-The Need for a Fresh Look

The writing about the problem of "inevitable inefficiency" in the
process of derivative litigation does not necessarily assume that
settlement is the solution to the problem. Rather, the availability of
settlement is portrayed as an influence exacerbating the proliferation and
reinforcing the inefficiency of lawsuits that raise the cost of capital. 124
Among the claims made are: (1) amounts paid in settlement are largely
unrelated to the merits of the action, 125 thereby blunting the sharpness
of suits as a means of enforcing :fiduciary obligations; (2) the motivation
for bringing suits is attorneys' fees, 126 which are better assured by
settlement than by litigation; (3) management does not oppose
settlements that fail to match the merits because "[m]anagement rarely
cares to assume the burdens and distractions of a trial;" 127 and (4) a
large percentage of derivative and class actions are said to be frivolous, 12 with the availability of attorneys' fees at settlement, even
without a monetary recovery-the presumed motivator. 129 Unlike the
case of the typical "bilateral" lawsuit, in which settlement often tends to
be touted as a panacea130 for the hazards of litigation, litigation harms
are identified as peculiarly intractable in lawsuits brought by shareholders in the name of the corporation. The specter of meritless lawsuits
ended by collusive settlements looms large as a conceptual block to
envisioning solutions devised out of the grab bag of techniques for
abbreviating litigation to serve everyone's interests. 131 The primary
123.
124.
125.

See Winter, supra note 4, at 951 n.25.
See id. at 950-51.
See id. at 950 (citing Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991)).
126. See id. at 949.
127. See id. at 950 (no supporting evidence).
128. Id. at 949 (citing FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING

STOCKHOLDERS DERIVATIVE SU1TS (1944)).
129. See id. (relying on Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation 'Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 55 (1991)).
130. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1341 ("The popular wisdom about
civil justice perceives courts as resolving cases by adjudication, accepts that American_
society brings an excessive amount of litigation to the courts, and concludes that
settlement is a good thing.").
131. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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solutions fashioned explicitly to address concern about derivative
litigation involve adjudication devices-adversarial confrontations,
authoritatively decided in court, between shareholder-propelled proponents of a continued suit and manager-supported opponents of continuing
the litigation 132 and other adjudication refinements, such as the requirement of pleading derivative suits with particularity. 133 Reform proposals articulate a need for an ideal solution: "Some mechanism . . . must
be adopted that weeds out meritless claims at the threshold, prevents
claims that cannot benefit investors from going forward, does not
overcompensate weak claims, and does not undercompensate strong
claims." 134 Because of the hypothesized impediments to party driven
solutions based on the assumption that party motivations are insufficiently adverse for greed to check greed, 135 Judge Winter has proposed the
creation of an outside force, i.e., a special master, capable of making a
sensitively calibrated determination of the moment when a derivative suit
can be concluded to be a net loser for investors. 136 The goal is to bear
the cost associated with such an ad hoc institutional framework in return
for the gain of deterring or quickly dismissing weak claims and avoiding
the settlement of strong claims at inadequate amounts. 137
Such analysis presumes that settlement of derivative suits is part of a
pathology, .and, not, as usually presumed in the evolution of thinking
about litigation, an element of an array of solutions to societal addiction
to litigation. 138 Yet that assumption, particularly coming from relatively conservative quarters, is a startling vote of no confidence in the
capacity of existing methods of reducing agency costs in the corporate

132. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51 (SLC); infra text accompanying
notes 158-68 (general description of procedures for dismissal of derivative litigation).
133. See Winter, supra note 4, at 952.
134. Id. at 977-78.
135. See supra part I; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The

Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI.L. REV. 1, 44 (1991) (describing perverse
incentives for parties to propose, and strong desire of judges to approve, settlements of
corporate litigation).
136. See Winter, supra note 4, at 953 (If the moment arrives when "the officer
determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the probability of a finding
of liability are not substantially greater than the likely costs to the corporation, then the
action should be dismissed.").
137. Id.
138. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1341.
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context 139 to place pressure on the processes surrounding settlement to
produce the benefits sought in the bringing and resolution of derivative
suits. The prevalence of such a vote of no confidence in quarters that
might be expected to see the good in pro-settlement refinements to the
litigation process is apparent in the large reduction in director liability
adopted by the Model Act 140 and the general acceleration of antilitigation proposals. 141 A fresh look at the question from the prosettlement view prevalent in other areas can direct attention conceptually
and practically to the role indemnification of settlements might play in
refining and strengthening derivative litigation as a mechanism of selfgovemance.
D.

Board Authority to Approve Morally Doubtful
Conduct-Comparison of Rules for Approving
Self-Interested Transactions

A final conceptual point relates to the type of conduct that is viewed
by the predominant legal doctrine as potentially blameworthy but not so
much so that the conduct cannot be sanctioned by the board of directors.
The salient instance in corporate doctrine of conduct occupying such an
intermediate status of moral weight is a director's engaging in a selfinterested transaction that would be considered subject to penalties but
is not because of the approval of other members of the board of
directors. 142 Conduct that was once flatly prohibited has, in the
evolution of doctrines to address the practical reality of corporate
business dealings, been granted a degree of statutory protection,
administered by boards of directors. 143 While the distance traveled for
the status of the conduct-from flat prohibition to a degree of statutory
approval-is the greatest for close corporations, 14 the statutory
assistance nonetheless applies to conduct by directors in public
corporations of the kind that might well become subject to derivative
suits in the absence of approval by a group of directors found eligible
under the statutes for "blessing" an arguably interested transaction by a
139. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 71, at 274-76 (reviewing alternative
methods of assuring contractual performance by corporate managers).
140. See supra note I.
141. See supra note 9.
142. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§§ 8.60-8.63 (3d ed. 1994) (directors'
conflicting interest transactions).
143. Importantly, the rationale is not the well-being of directors but the business
needs of corporations. The residual effect is advantage to directors, but the driving force
is the needs of business.
144. Public corporations do not generally engage in direct transactions, in which a
director sells property to the corporation. N.Y.S.E. Listed Co. Manual (CCH) ¶ 307.00.
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director. 145 Indeed, the type of transaction in public corporations that
can be insulated by the format of approval is of the type that is
potentially subject to derivative suits--proposed organic changes in
which directors have motives of entrenchment or self-advancement. The
policy choice in law-making may well be between allowing directors to
prospectively bless a doubtful transaction without direct challenge versus
requiring after-the-fact justification.
In short, the convergence of types of conduct that can be blessed with
types of conduct for which directors might be indemnified demonstrates
that the quality of conduct or the trustworthiness of directorial judgments
about such quality of their fellow directors' conduct is not the deciding
consideration in the gap that exists in the capacity of boards of directors
to end derivative suits by inducing directors to settle them. The blessing
of interested director statutes demonstrates that a broad range of conduct
exists that, while attracting some degree of disapprobation, can expose
directors to potential litigation losses that, consensus concludes, can and
should be ameliorated by the action of fellow directors. 146 The
recognition that the directors are exercising a similar judgment and
creating a similar outcome, at least in terms of symbolic policing of
business morals, when they approve interested director transactions as
when they provide indemnification, points to an analysis of the pressure
placed on the integrity of board decision-making by the structuring of
the judgmental issue presented to the board. Such structuring is created
by the form in which the issue is presented-approving self-interested
transactions, indemnifying directors for settlement amounts or indemnifying directors for amounts paid in judgment, and, of course, recommending dismissal of a derivative suit.
In order to understand the existing consensus and its extent of
divergence from the SLC model, we must first examine the fundamentals
of derivative litigation.

145. Cf Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 683 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994)
(ground rules for court determinations of entire fairness where a controlling or
dominating shareholder in a public corporation appoints an independent committee to
negotiate the terms of a forced merger of a subsidiary into a parent); Cookies Food
Prods., Inc, v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988) (application
of interested director approval statute to self-dealing transactions by controlling
shareholder/director in close corporation with passive investors).
146. See supra note 14.
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Ill.

BACK TO THE BASICS-AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION

The boards of directors of public corporations are agents charged with
a duty to exercise business judgment and to act with due care and with
disinterest on behalf of shareholders. 147 Shareholders have limited
ability to protect their interests directly or to influence board decisionmaking. 148 The shareholder derivative suit allows shareholders to seek
damages payable to the corporate treasury for director's breach of a
fiduciary duty. 149 In a shareholder derivative suit, a shareholder sues
the breaching board member in the right of the corporation. 150 The
purpose is to allow shareholders to force action when the board iis
reluctant to proceed against one or more other board members. 151

a

A.

Governing Principles

The basic corporate· law principle that boards retain control of the
business affairs of a corporation remains operative even when derivative
litigation is pending. 152 The rationales are substantial and well rehearsed in corporate law. Critically, no sole shareholder or group of
shareholders has a duty or ability comparable to the board's to safeguard
the corporation's interests. 153 An unconstrained license to sue directors
would inflict devastating harm on the routine pursuit of the corporation's
affairs. 154 The state corporation code statutes governing derivative
suits respond to such considerations by providing procedures to enable

147. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 20-44 (discussion of the duties of
directors).
148. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 588 (commenting that no
single technique of corporate accountability is likely to be optimal under all circumstances and suggesting that shareholders are best served by an overlapping system of
protections); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 396 (1986) (discussing
inadequacy of proxy contest as solution to collective action problem).
149. WILLIAM A. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 928-35 (6th ed. 1988) (explaining shareholder derivative suits).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 928.
152. "[The dismissal section] confirms the basic principle that a derivative suit is
an action on behalf of the corporation and therefore should be controlled by those
directors who can exercise an independent business judgment with respect to its
continuance." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN., ch. 7, subch. D, introductory
comment (discussing "Derivative Proceedings").
153. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 71, at 271-72.
154. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 7, at 522, cited in Granada Invs. v. DWG Corp.,
823 F. Supp. 448, 455-56 (N.D. Ohio 1993).

'
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boards of directors to bring an end to at least some shareholder
derivative suits. 155

1.

Corporate Best Interests

The derivative suit statutes attempt to devise procedures that will allow
a role for shareholder efforts to bring directors to task yet still accord
respect to board judgments of corporate best interests. 156 The first role
that the statutes set forth for the board concerns the right of the
shareholder to maintain the suit. 157 Statutes set up a procedure for
boards to ask the court to dismiss the suit as not in the best interests of
the corporation. 158 The Model Act, for instance, provides that the
court shall dismiss a derivative action if a statute-specified determining
group "has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable
inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the
derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation." 159

2.

Procedure: The SLC

Again using the Model Act for illustration, the determining votes may
arise from either a majority vote of independent directors present at a
meeting of the board if the independent directors constitute a quorum,
or, without reference to the quorum, a majority vote of a committee
consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by majority
vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of
directors. 160 In the alternative, upon motion by the corporation, a court
may appoint a panel of independent persons to make a determination. 161 Typically, corporations avail themselves of the opportunity to
make a credible statement to the court about the worthiness of the
litigation by appointing a committee of independent directors. This

155. See, e.g., BLOCK ET AL., supra note 4, at 721-33 (function of demand
requirement to retain director control over derivative suits); id. at 830-34 (describing
state statutes patterened after Model Act provisions for dismissal of derivative
proceedings upon motion of independent directors).
156. Id. at 711-20.
157. See id. at 830-34.
158. Id.
159. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44 (3d ed. 1994).
160. Id. § 7.44(b)(l)-(2).
161. Id. § 7.44(f).
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committee, which is called an "SLC" or special litigation committee,
discussed above, then investigates the charges. 162 This statutorily
blessed group gains stature from the experience and independence of its
membership. 163 It proceeds to determine whether maintenance of the
suit is in the best interests of the corporation. 164 If the SLC's conclusion is negative, the corporation then moves to dismiss the suit. As
noted above, dismissal must occur if the corporation has met the
statutory standards of a good faith determination following reasonable
inquiry upon which the conclusion is based. 165
The Model Act places the burden of proof for this issue on the
corporation if a majority of the board of directors does not consist of
independent directors at the time the determination is made. The burden
is placed on the plaintiff if the majority of the board of directors does
consist of independent directors at the time of the determination. 166
Despite differences in the particular approaches taken in various codes,
the typical refrain-the one expressed in the Model Act-is to allow the
board to retain its primary role as the conservator of the corporation's
best interests even though one or more members of the board may be
implicated in wrongdoing. 167

3.

Consensual Resolutions

Although the screening device may end litigation, in effect aborting
it at the outset, it does so through a full blown legal contest. 168 In
contrast, many of the actual pathways for ending a derivative suit short
of judgment require negotiation and consensus of the parties. Yet,
compared with the screening mechanism, scenarios for consensual
endings receive little statutory attention. 169 The disparity is unsurpris-

162. See DEMOTT, supra note 1, § 5:14, at 56-58 (describing creation by
corporations of special litigation committees).
163. See, e.g., In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (applying a
"totality of the circumstances" test to assess independence of Special Litigation
Committee (citing Johnson v. Hui, 811 F. Supp. 479, 486 (N.D. Cal. 1991))).
164. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44(a) (3d ed. 1994).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 7.44(e).
167. Id. § 7.44 & cmt.
168. It is beyond the scope of this Article to document the procedural and
chronological sequence of discovery and litigation about whether to litigate the alleged
cause of action that takes place in a typical dismissal procedure. See generally Joel
Seligman, The Disinterested Person, An Alternative Approach to Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357, 360-62 (1992) for a discussion of the
discovery process in the litigation of motions to dismiss derivative litigation.
169. The basic rules respecting settlement of derivative suits are described tersely
in the Model Act as follows: "A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or
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ing, because a negotiation is not a legal contest and does not require
formal elaboration. Nonetheless, consensual endings are frequently of
more practical import than an initial argument over the future of the
litigation. The screening process, heavily elaborated as a moment of
formal legal decision-making, is in fact a moment that may never arrive
for many suits. 170 As a principle example, in suits that the board of
directors chooses to settle without at any time seeking to reject the
shareholder's effort to proceed on behalf of the corporation, the ending
may foreclose the need for the screening mechanism. 171
Thus, suits come and go in a multitude of fashions. Their means of
exit share one feature in common--the legal system has found a way to
bless a termination of the suit. The board may seek to constrain a
shareholder's effort to prosecute to judgment .a suit in the interest of the
corporation by a variety of means: (1) rejection of demand 172 coupled
with a motion of the corporation to dismiss 173 based on a special
litigation committee's recommendation (the screening process); or (2)
settlement encouraged by either (a) payment of the defendant directors'
costs of suit, including fees or settlement amounts or both, or (b) a
structural remedy that imposes no damages on the defendant directors.174 These suit-ending efforts may occur-indeed will occur-in

settled without the court's approval. If the court determines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the interests of the corporation's shareholders
or a class of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders
affected." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.45 (3d ed. 1994).
170. DEMOTT, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 2 ("Most derivative suits are ultimately
dismissed or settled rather than tried.").
171. See, e.g., In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (describing
SLC's conclusion that settlement was superior to moving to terminate the derivative
action entirely in light of settlement's capping fees and costs at amount less than
potential fees and costs of litigating motion to dismiss).
172. The Model Act requires a shareholder who intends to pursue derivative
litigation to place a demand to sue upon the corporation, to wit:
"No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until:
(1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action; and
(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the
shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by
the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result
by waiting for the expiration of the 90 day period."
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.42 (3d ed. 1994).
173. Id. § 7.44.
, 174. For example, procedures may be put in place to avoid repetition of the
behavior challenged by the litigation. The suit may terminate on this basis with no
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different derivative suits in sequences and with practical meanings that
are part of the unique shape of the given suit. The statutes, by
concentrating attention on the role of the board at the entry screen,
address only a portion of the available termination scenarios for a given
derivative suit. It is the underreasoning, a form of neglect not unique to
corporate statutes, 175 by the statutory drafters respecting the remainder
of litigation-ending events that has given rise to the problem addressed
by this Article.

B.

A Gap in the Board s Role

As seen above, the Model Act's conceptualization of the screening of
derivative litigation does not displace the deference granted to director
action, and, absent disabling conflict, 176 accords a presumption· of
regularity to board judgment. 177 In the statutory planning for derivative litigation, where the question of the amount of liability is set aside
and the ground rules for engagement between management and
shareholder representatives are devised, a balance is sought that protects
the board's role compared with outside decision-makers. Courts have a
vital role, yet a limited one. The Model Act provides courts with
techniques that avert their displacing the directors of corporations at the
urging of derivative plaintiffs.

payment by the defendants, although the corporation will pay a counsel's fee to
plaintiff's lawyer for the benefit to the corporation that resulted from the lawsuit. See,
e.g., Granada Invs. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 451 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (settlement
dismissing claims against defendant Victor Posner in exchange for Posner's relinquishment of both board positions and exercise of voting control over common stock of
company).
175. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1390-91.
Once courts were envisioned as dedicated exclusively to adjudication, so that
settlement was seen as the product of a consensual private departure from the
public forum. The results were an accidental byproduct for which the court
was not accountable.... But now it is common knowledge that most remedy
seeking in the vicinity of courts is going to eventuate in settlement. We share
an inescapable awareness that courts do more than adjudicate. They preside
over a cluster of dispute processes. They project models, sanctions, bargaining
chips, categories, and doctrine that support processes of negotiation, mediation,
and arbitration, some within the precincts of the courts and some at a distance.
Once we see settlements not as a stray byproduct of the judicial process, but
as part of the essential core, the responsibilities of courts can no longer be
defined as co-extensive with adjudication. Once we apprehend the multiplex
connection between court and settlement, ensuring the quality of these
processes and the settlements they produce is a central task of the administration of justice.
Id. (footnote omitted).
176. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.44 {e) {3d ed. 1994).
177. Id.

1106

[VOL. 32: 1063, 1995]

Neglected Policy Option
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Why does the Model Act derivative suit procedure appear to repose
such confidence in boards? The answer lies in part in the unsuitability,
well described in volumes of legal and. business writing, 178 of any
other candidate. Given the depth of the consensus that the board must
govern, for no one else can, the Model Act, like the corporate codes it
influences, is based on a vis.ion of the corporation as a profit maximizing
entity using agents to advance the wealth of a collective body of
shareholders. 179 The underlying psychology, determined in degrees by
necessity rather than science, depicts agents, pulled by the ties of
collegiality and friendship, 180 but capable of functioning honestly to
advance the best interests of the corporation,-i.e. capable of making
honest determinations that the best interests of the corporation will be
served by rejections of shareholder efforts to sue directors on the
corporation's behalf. 181 The picture of board authority over litigation
developed by the Model Act drafters is a particularly bright one. The
Model Act displays a limited degree of concern for structural bias, 182
but generally grants directors who are not lawsuit targets their undiminished status as :fiduciaries when making derivative suit determinations,
whatever the course of events that brought them to the board. 183

178. See, e.g., BLOCK, ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-11 (discussing the historical view
that neither courts nor shareholders are competent to manage corporations).
179. See id. at 8 (discussing need of directors for broad discretion to permit
decisions entailing risk). See also Granada Invs . .v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459
(N.D. Ohio 1993) (citing Daniel H. Pink, The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good/or
America Good/or General Motors?, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 180, 181 (1990)).
180. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 7, at 534 (skeptical summary of concept of
structural bias). For a vigorously argued view that numerous factors militate against
independent directors' acting independently to disapprove overreaching interested
transactions by fellow directors or· to evaluate the merits of derivative suits
evenhandedly, see Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 607-20 (1982).
181. See Brudney, supra note 180, at 607-20 (arguing that outside directors have
incentives to act independently of management).
182. Although the normal rule is that the plaintiff has the burden of challenging the
bona fides of a committee that determined that continuation of a suit is not in the
corporation's best interests, the burden shifts to the corporation when the majority of the
entire board is deemed not to be independent of the litigation. With a seeming
reluctance, the committee adopted this burden-shifting rule "to respond to concerns of
structural bias." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN., commentary to § 7.44 (3d ed.
1994).
183. But see DEMOTT, supra note 1, § 5:16, at 65 ("[C]ourts have not arrived at
a consensus position on the appropriateness of the litigation committee device as a
means to determine the corporation's position in derivative litigation, nor do courts agree
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If boards are the forum for shaping shareholder efforts to litigate on
the corporation's behalf into a case disposition that protects the best
interests of the corporation, gaps in the ability of the board to act as a
source of authority for any type of ending scenario represent a puzzling
impairment of boards' ability to act constructively on behalf of
shareholders, at least where director misconduct is implicated. A
gap--whereby boards are not merely hampered but precluded from
effecting a particular type of resolution-would suggest that the Model
Act drafters, despite their seemingly happy view of the credibility of
board determinations in dismissal proceedings, have not discarded all
worries about board credibility and good faith in derivative suit
litigation. If such a gap also disabled boards from taking the practical
steps necessary to achieve a settlement, it is of both practical and
theoretical interest.
As already discussed above, the existence of such a gap is clear. In
the flow of real world litigation, it is a significant subtraction from the
authority and the ability of a board to end derivative litigation on a
schedule that it considers to serve the best interests of the corporation.
While statutory provisions for ending derivative litigation recognize that
some suits will end in settlement, 184 the heavy consensus condemns
indemnification of directors for amounts paid in settlement of derivative
litigation. 185 Yet settlement negotiations-the weighing and measuring, chopping and cutting, buying and selling-take place between
parties who have something to offer and something to gain. If the
amount paid in settlement cannot be indemnified-thus making
impossible the board's assuring such indemnification-the defendant
directors may lack the incentive to accept a settlement on terms desired
by the board. The board, however, may view a settlement as the
quickest, least costly method of terminating the suit, a method plainly
superior to a longer, more expensive procedure involving the screening
of the case by an SLC and the litigation by all parties of a corporate
motion to dismiss. Such a possibility is by no means fanciful, as is seen
in a recent federal district court decision in which the court agreed with

on the appropriate degree or content of judicial review in this context."); id. § 5.18, at
71 (questioning credibility of special litigation committees, especially use of
'"expansion' or replacement directors to c.onstitute ... committee"). Compare Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the "conflict of interest which
renders the business judgment rule inapplicable in the case of directors who are
defendants is hardly eliminated by the creation of a special litigation committee").
184. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§ 7.45 (discontinuance or settlement); see
also Michigan Business Corporation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1496 (West
1990 & Supp. 1995) (discontinuance or settlement of derivative proceeding).
185. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2.
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the SLC that it was in the best interests of the corporation to settle the
suit rather than to engage in a litigation of a dismissal motion. 186 The
perverse effect of the condemnation is therefore to hobble the efforts of
the only group charged with a duty to the corporation--its board of
directors. The plaintiff's lawyer is concerned with her fee, the
defendants with their skin, the insurance company, if any, with its
treasury. The board alone is directed to ,consider with dispassion the
interests of the shareholders.
IV.

EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: THE PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT

As previously noted, the drafters of corporate legislation hesitated to
accord to boards a role in a principal practical mode of terminating
derivative litigation largely because of relatively abstracted arguments
and intuitions. The forces that ordinarily serve as advocates for the
interests of management uncharacteristically abandon the pro-management perspective on indemnification of directors for settlement
payments, saving their firepower for an assault on the legitimacy of
shareholder initiated litigation and the existence of liability for directors.
Let us look critically at the anti-indemnification arguments as they have
generally been presented.
A.

The Arguments Against Indemnification of Settlement Amounts
1.

Circularity

The principal theme struck against allowing indemnification of
settlement amounts, that is, the principal argument favoring a gap in the
board's practical ability to end derivative litigation, is circularity of
recovery. Circularity of recovery refers to the immediate return by the
corporation to a director of amounts paid by that director in settlement
of a suit charging a breach of directorial duty. 187 The idea imbedded

In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-44 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note l, at 761; AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 918 (discussing circularity in connection with prohibition of
indemnification of amounts paid to satisfy an adverse judgment); BLOCK, ET AL., supra
note 4, at 958 {"The basis for this rule [against indemnification of settlement amounts]
is a belief that it would be circular if funds received by the corporation (the ultimate
186.
187.
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in the phrase is that derivative litigation which ends in the return of the
recovered amounts to the defendant is not only futile but indeed harmful
to the corporation. As the ABA Commentary states:
Permitting indemnification of settlements and judgments in derivative
proceedings would give rise to a circularity in which the corporation receiving
payment of damages by the director in the settlement or judgment (less
attorneys' fees) would then immediately return the same amount to the director
(including attorneys' fees) as indemnification. Thus, the corporation would be
in a poorer economic position than if there had been no proceeding. 188
.

.

A strong intuition wars with allowing such a result..

a.

The Inaptness of a "Corporate Waste." Argument

The ABA Commentary, however, pairs the recommendation and
argument against indemnification of amounts paid in settlement with the
recommendation against indemnification of amounts paid to satisfy an
adverse judgment. 189 This pairing erases a critical distinction between
the two types of indemnification. Only by restoring the distinction may
the analysis prove instructive. Where circularity concerns repayment by
the corporation to the director of judgment amounts, the argument seems
plainly to be a good fit for the corporate law goal of advancing the best
interests of the corporation. When a director has been found liable for
misconduct in a court adjudication, no construction is viable that the
corporation's interest would be served by sending the recovery in a
circle back to the civilly liable director. Indeed, where the circumstance
involves an adverse judgment, classic corporate doctrine bristles with
rules 190 that would prohibit a board-authorized approval of a return
payment, for which a benefit to the corporation appears wholly.lacking.
Seen in this light, the meaning of the circularity reference, which carries
such persuasive power as a one word summary of the case against
indemnification of amounts paid in judgment, is that boards should not

plaintiff on whose behalf an action by or in the right of a corporation is brought) were
simply returned to the defendant director who paid them." (citing DEBORAH A. DEMOTT,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE§ 6:08, at 6-54 (1994) and
1 ERNEST L. FOLK, ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 145.5 (3rd ed. 1992 & Supp. 1992))).
188. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 761.
189. Id.
190. See Kaufman v. Beal, 1983 WL 20295, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1983)
(doctrine of corporate waste applied to payment to directors found to have lacked a
corporate purpose), discussed in Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business
Judgment Rule, and The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus.
LAW. 1355, 1365 (1993).
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waste corporate assets by paying sums of money without any matching
benefit to the corporation. 191
In contrast, indemnification of directors for sums paid in settlement
could indeed involve a consideration of the corporation's best interests
in that the possibility of indemnification may play a central role in a
consideration by the board of a method of disposing of litigation that
appears to be bringing more harm to the corporation th.an possible
benefit. 192 A determination that the corporation's best interests would
be served by a settlement that is encouraged by-and perhaps dependent
upon--indemnification of the settlement is a prudential judgment that is
located in the· very heart of the board's responsibility to exercise
business judgment. The term circularity of recovery lacks an animating
meaning when transposed from the context of an adverse judgment to
the context of a settlement. The force of the argument, powerful in the
instance of the adverse judgment, is fully spent on its proper object, and
wholly unpersuasive when aimed recklessly at a genuine business
judgment rendered by the board.
Moreover, the argument of circularity does not show a consistency
with the overall model for board management of derivative litigation.
The prototype for board management of derivative litigation is to
provide a mechanism that enables the board to deem a suit "not in the
best interests" of the corporation and for courts to provide some measure
of respect for that determination. 193 While specific implementations
of the prototype vary in the degree of deference accorded the board
mechanism, the Model Act and the specific statutes have in common the
expectation that the board may create an outcome in which the
corporation receives a recovery of zero. The phrase circularity of
recovery, while piquant, nonetheless describes a result that is the
equivalent of the outcome of board-driven dismissals of derivative
litigation--zero recovery for the corporation. In fact, since costs are
inevitably incurred in the dismissal proceeding, the corporation will as
much be a net loser in this scenario as in a negotiated termination
involving indemnification of amounts paid in settlement. Thus,
191. Cf Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293
(N.Y. 1955) (discussing common law rules disfavoring reimbursement of directors' and
insurgents' expenses in proxy contests).
192. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 890 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a derivative
suit may be dismissed if a court finds that dismissal is in the corporation's best interest).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 156-67.
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circularity does not describe a result that differs from other available
outcomes in the prototype and cannot be viewed as an objection on the
basis of outcome.

b.

Inconsistency with Treatment of Expenses

The argument of circularity is also inconsistent with the typical
generosity of the models in allowing boards to reimburse a director's
expenses, even where the director settles the suit with an admission of
culpability. 194 Although the funds used to repay the legal fees are not
sent in a tight circle, in that the payment funds legal fees rather than
liability, the principle remains the same. The payment to the corporation
is reduced by a simultaneous payment to the director. That payment for
fees may well exceed the recovery to the corporation. Indeed, the longer
the litigation persists, the more that such legal fees will mount, imposing
on the corporation a risk of a suit ending in a low recovery where the
corporation is contractually obligated to provide indemnification. 195
Mounting legal fees add to the circumference of a circle of futile activity
and wasteful expenditures in many instances. Yet the prototype of

194. The MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. provides in newly adopted § 8.51
(d)(l) (3d ed. 1994):
Unless ordered by a court under section 8.54(a)(3), a corporation may not
indemnify a director:
(1) in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation,
except for reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding
if it is determined that the director has met the relevant standard of conduct
under section (a).
Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 756 (setting forth the text of the
proposed statute).
195. It should be noted that contracts that entitle directors to reimbursement are
enforceable. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.58 {3d ed. 1994), which
permits a corporation to obligate itself in advance to provide indemnification that is
authorized by the statute. See also Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 77980 (setting forth text of proposed statute and commenting: "Many corporations have
adopted such provisions, often with shareholder approval."). It is also of interest that,
once such obligatory indemnification has been provided by contract with the director,
courts have counted the prospective obligation to reimburse attorneys' fees as one of the
costs that counts against the advisability of continued litigation. See In re Oracle, 852
F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that because "the indemnicy agreements
require Oracle to advance to the individual defendants their costs of suits which the
defendants are not required to reimburse unless they are found not to be entitled to
indemnification . . . Oracle faces the prospect of financing both sides of the derivative
litigation"). Cf. Joy, 692 F.2d at 892 (counting as costs of continuing the litigation
indemnification that is mandatory under corporate by-laws, private contract or state law
but refusing to count for best interest determination indemnification the corporation may
pay as a matter of discretion).
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derivative litigation views the circle in which legal fees travel as
tolerable despite the futility. 196

2.

Concerns about Meritless Suits

Although the circularity argument does not of itself justify the gap in
a board's ability to influence the outcome of derivative litigation that the
bar on indemnification produces, there are other justifications, both
practical and theoretical, that merit close attention. The portion of the
Model Act commentary quoted earlier continues:
In view of these considerations [liability limiting code provisions], it is unlikely
that directors will be unnecessarily exposed to meritless actions. In addition,
if directors were to be indemnified for amounts paid in settlement, the dismissal
procedures ... might not be fully employed since it could be less expensive for
the corporation to indemnify the directors immediately for the amount of the
claimed damages rather than bear the expense of the inquiry required by [the
dismissal procedures]. The result could increase the filing of meritless
derivative proceedings in order to generate small but immediately paid
attorneys' fees. 197

The arguments advanced are twofold. One relates to the absence of
meritless suits, and the other to their presence.

a.

Specious Litigation As the Wrong Issue

The first argument is that indemnification of s_ettlement amounts is
unnecessary since specious suits are unlikely to occur. The second is
that authorization for indemnification of settlement amounts will, in selfdefeating fashion, create incentives for such suits.
The initial argument is undeniably correct to the extent that it
characterizes specious litigation as a fairly minor problem. The barriers

196. In this regard the Model Act is typical. See Committee on Corporate Laws,
supra note 1, at 756, 761-62 (setting forth text of§ 8.5l(d)(l) authorizing board to
indemnify for legal expenses even in the case of settlement and commenting: "Despite
the prohibitions on indemnification of a settlement or a judgment in a derivative
proceeding, subsection (d)(l) permits indemnification of the related reasonable expenses
incurred in that proceeding so long as the director meets the relevant standards of
conduct set forth in section 8.5l(a)."); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note
2, § 7.20 (b)(l)(d) (excluding board payment of settlement amounts but not excluding
board payment of expenses where director settles case); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b)
(1991) (allowing indemnification of attorneys' fees in settlements).
197. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 761.
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standing in the way of strike suits adequately protect corporations from
rampant harassing litigation. Yet the argument misdescribes the type of
suit to which corporations need to take strong, flexible responses. The
Model Act fails to address the practical threat to directors that lies in the
possibility that complex corporate transactions may, although conducted
in good faith, give rise to colorable claims of breach of duty, particularly
where self interest is involved. 198 It is these claims that can produce
the type of protracted, expensive litigation that the board would probably
wish to terminate at a cost lower than that which continued litigation
would produce. The ability to indemnify amounts paid in settlement
would provide an avenue to end the matter via settlement, an avenue that
may otherwise prove unacceptable to the defendant directors.
Of course, if the suit is harmful to the corporation's interests, the
corporation could seek termination via the screening process set forth in
the statutes. Yet, as previously suggested and as the Model Act
commentary notes, authorization to indemnify directors for amounts paid
in settlement may lead a board to forego the screening route where the
realities of the case point to a cheaper, more expeditious method of
termination based on settlement via indemnification. On its face, the
result is not a bad one. Legislative strictures that demand that more
cumbersome and costly methods be utilized cannot be said to be
obviously in the corporation's best interests. Thus, the gap referred to
earlier produces its effect. Nonetheless, there are additional considerations that cannot be ignored, which suggest that closing the gap will
produce unwanted side effects.

b.

Board Resistance io "Strike Suits"

In the course of its second argument noted above, the Model Act
commentary suggests that the ease of termination that settlement plus
indemnification produces carries with it the encouragement of strike suits
in which plaintiffs' lawyers expect to be, and are in effect, bribed to
accept the settlement. Yet it is not apparent why such. suits should
appear to be a pressing problem. 199 Here the concern primarily
emanates from a protective stance toward target corporations, which
would pay unnecessary settlements and legal fees and suffer the
distraction of numerous nuisance suits. The argument is not supported
by reference to any empirical evidence or case lore, and should .be

198. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
199. See supra note 35 (arguing that corporations may benefit if boards assess
merits more generously in a settlement posture than in a court adjudication approach);
see also infra note 200.

1114

[VOL. 32: I 063, 1995]

Neglected Policy Option
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

assessed in light of other disciplinary mechanisms for discouraging
meritless litigation. 200 In light of sanctions for frivolous litigation
imposed by the courts and the attorney's ethical duties in signing
pleadings, the argument does not appear strong on its own merits.
What of this argument's fit into the overaH conception of derivative
litigation? It appears to be a poor fit. The board is conceived of as a
body that is vigilant to protect the corporation's business interests and
is thus empowered in the prototype model for dismissing derivative
litigation to make inquiries and determinations that result in the dismissal
of suits.201 The model reposes trust in the board's ability to form
judgments about the appropriate level of inquiry necessitated by the
gravity and credibility of the charges. Statutes presuppose sufficient
inquiries where the charges are grave,202 in a circumstance where
considerable temptation for rote recitations praying for a "best interests"
dismissal of charges against colleagues looms large in the eyes of critics
of the model dismissal procedures.203 While the board is trusted to dig
a deep trench of investigation204 when charges against present or
former colleagues are grave and credible, it isnot trusted to safeguard
the interests of the corporation in responding to meritless suits. While
it may be true that well funded targets have the occasional impulse to
ward off pests with small payments, genuine harm would only arise if
weak willed corporate boards were so disposed to dispense sums of
money as to create a culture of corporate blackmail reminiscent of
nineteenth century matrimonial suits handled by the firm of Howe &
Hummel. 205 Such deterioration of the corporate ethical climate will
not occur if for no other reason than the fact that directors will not ask

200. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. A more vigilant stance against potential meritless litigation
may have been thought necessary at one time because of courts' traditional reluctance
to require the payment of attorneys' fees for frivolous lawsuits. See CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 16.6 (1986).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 156-67.
202. But see DEMOTT, supra note 1.
203. Brudney, supra note 180; see also Seligman, supra note 168 (discussing
discovery).
204. But see Brudney, supra note 180, at 607-20 (skepticism concerning
independent directors' independence); Seligman, supra note 168, at 361 (deficiencies of
SLC fact-finding) .
205. Cf RICHARD H. ROVERE, HOWE & HUMMEL: THEIR TRUE AND SCANDALOUS
HISTORY 112 (1947) (general charges of seduction under the promise of marriage
redeemable by alleged seducers at sums varying between five and ten thousand dollars).
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their colleagues to sully their reputations by pleading guilty to totally
unfounded allegations of scurrilous behavior.

3.

Structural Bias

Although never stated in the Model Act commentary, the fundamental
objection to indemnification for amounts paid in settlement, indeed the
only objection that has serious force, is that its very utility in permitting
expeditious termination of suits makes it easier for structural bias206 to
rear its head once more. The concern is that a board, sympathetic to the
plight of fellow directors who :find themselves the target of litigation,
will seek to take them out of the line of :fire regardless of the merits of
the case. To the extent that this does occur, individual corporations will
lose the benefit of litigation in which they would be net gainers, and the
deterrent effect of derivative suits is diluted. The same concern, of
course, is present in the screening process, where the Model Act drafters
grant considerable deference to a directorial determination that continued
litigation is not in the best interests of the corporation. Nonetheless, in
that situation, immediate judicial review occurs, a factor that is not
involved in a board determination to pay indemnification. It would
therefore seem that the structuralbias risk is greater in the indemnification situation.
In fact it is doubtful that this is the case. Two responses are apparent,
the :first of only modest rebuttal value and the second of much stronger
force. The :first concerns the opportunity that settlement approval
proceedings afford the court to learn of the intended indemnification. If
indemnification of settlement is to occur, it will normally be part of an
arrangement in which the board consents to the payment in order for the
settlement to be accomplished. At the time the parties present the
settlement to the court for approval, candor will require that they also
apprise the court of the indemnification arrangement. A degree of
judicial examination of that aspect of the case is likely to occur. 207
The judicial review will not, however, be of the most far-reaching
variety. Concededly, the judicial approval of a settlement takes place in
the context of a proceeding in which all parties are in agreement; no one
is challenging any aspect of the proposed case resolution. The consequence may be a less searching judicial review at the point of settlement
than after the heated debate surrounding a corporate motion to dismiss
following a statutory screening procedure.

206. See supra note 10.
207. See In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (judicial
recognition of the expectation of indemnification of defendant directors' attorneys' fees).
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Nonetheless, although judicial review of the indemnification process
may not of itself calm all fears about structural bias, a second response
to fears about structural bias provides a significant degree of comfort.
The decision to indemnify must be made in compliance with statutory
standards. The board must decide that the settling directors either
engaged in conduct for which the statute allows corporate charters to
eliminate liability or that they acted in good faith and in a reasonable
belief that the action was in, or not opposed to, the corporation's best
interests.208 Thus, the board must not only determine that its grant of
indemnification is itself in the corporation's best interests, but also that
the relevant standard for indemnification has been met. A failure to
comply with the duties leaves the board vulnerable to possible personal
liability209 (unless the Model Act's new provision, adopted in 1994, is
in effect-allowing elimination of personal liability for conduct if it falls
short of receipt of a financial benefit to which a director is not entitled,
an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or its shareholders,
or an intentional violation of criminal law.)210 This vulnerability, a

208. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 756 (setting forth proposed
§ 8.51(a) requiring a corporation to indemnify a director if"(i) he conducted himself in
good faith; and (ii) (A) in the case of conduct in his official capacity, that his conduct
was in the best interests of the corporation; and (B) in all other cases, that his conduct
was at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation"); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1994) (featuring a similar standard).
209. See supra note 87.
210. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§ 2.02(b).
The articles of incorporation may set forth:
(4) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the
corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or
any failure to take action, as a director, except liability for:
(A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he
is not entitled;
(B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders·
(C) a violation of section 8.33; or
(D) an intentional violation of criminal law.
Id.
By comparison, Delaware law allows liability to be eliminated for breaches of
fiduciary duty other than, among others, breaches of the duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its shareholders, acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law, or a transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
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vulnerability that Code writers have the option of reinforcing, 211
contrasts sharply with both the minimal risk that directors face when
seeking to have a suit dismissed via the screening process and the veil
of good faith that is tossed across the fact-finding on which is predicated
an SLC finding that a proceeding is not in the best interests of the
corporation.212 In a dismissal proceeding, the directors are attempting
to convince a court to respect their conclusion that the suit should end.
Assuming that they have not flagrantly misled the judge, the danger of
some sanction is remote. 213 The decision to indemnify, however, is
one that the board makes and must accept responsibility for. Thus, the
desire to assist fellow directors and remain loyal to the group may be
tempered by a reasonable concern to preserve personal reputation and
avoid exposure to renewed legal proceedings.
One might argue that the legal hazard of improper indemnification is
virtually obliterated by the statutory permissions to eliminate, by
provisions inserted in the articles of incorporation, personal liability for
negligent conduct by directors, particularly given the Model Act
broadening of the permitted exculpatory language as compared with'the
language in Delaware.214 Given the broad exculpation permitted by

211. See infra text accompanying notes 237-38.
212. See Seligman, supra note 168, at 361 for a litany of the manifold deficiencies
of the fact-finding process in which counsel for a special litigation committee engages
(describing lesser incentive of SLC counsel to probe witness' veracity compared with
adversarial counsel, lesser penalties for witness memory lapse or fabrication than in
courtroom, psychological predisposition of SLC counsel to accept corporate witness
claims, and limitations of evidentiary basis for SLC counsel to question witnesses).
It should be noted that the issue presented to the court is not whether continuing the
suit is in the best interests of the corporation, but whether the court finds that the SLC
has made a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which
its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the
best interests of the corporation. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.§ 7.44(a) (3d ed.
1994). Thus, the investigation need only withstand scrutiny as to good faith and
reasonableness, not accuracy, thoroughness, or even defensibility of the conclusion.
Arguably, the standard for dismissal and the structure of the decision-making process is
less demanding than in the case of approval of interested director transactions. In the
latter, the safe harbor protection of such transactions. from later attack can vanish if
disclosure is inadequate. Moreover, some cases suggest that courts should apply a
"heightened scrutiny" to transactions in which a portion of the board blesses the interested-director transaction of other members of the board. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Act
ANN. § 8.31 cmt. (1970) ("sole purpose of section 8.31. is to sharply limit the common
law principle of automatic voidability" conflict of interest transactions); see also Fliegler
v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,222 (Del. 1976) (conflict of interest section does not remove
conflict of interest from judicial scrutiny); Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes
Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1988) (holding that the common
law relating to interested director transactions is not negated by statutory procedures to
allow interested director transactions without clear breach of duty).
213. See Seligman, supra note 168, at 361 (concerning fact-finding).
214. See supra note 210.
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the Model Act, secondary liability to which directors might be subject
is relatively unrealistic.
This need not be considered an insuperable problem. The solution is
relatively straightforward. Any code provision permitting indemnification of directors for payment of settlement amounts should be accompanied by a code provision excepting decisions to award such indemnity
from the coverage of the liability limiting provision. The provision as
it now exists is arguably insufficiently nuanced. It extends the right of
prospective exculpation of directors to all corporations for all types of
corporation transactions, whether routine or extraordinary in nature and
limited only by actual receipt of an improper personal benefit or by the
commission of an intentional and focused act of harm aimed (seemingly
maliciously) at the corporation. The provision is noncontextual,
conferring limitation of liability on the vast array of corporate entities
wholly without reference to qualifying characteristics. As will be
discussed below, thinking about the context of indemnification draws
attention to the possibilities of more nuanced policy choices for
corporate accountability. The statutory means are readily at hand to
strengthen the moral currency in which indemnification decisions are
made and to maintain the advantage in director accountability of
indemnification scenarios for lawsuit termination over dismissal
scenarios.

4.

Consideration of Deterrence Value

For such reasons, concern that the deterrence value of derivative
litigation would be diluted by authorizing indemnification of settlements
seems misplaced as well. Among the goals of an indemnification statute
propounded by the drafters of the Model Act is to "prohibit indemnification where it might protect or encourage wrongful or improper conduct. "215 While loss of deterrence is not cited in the case in chief
against indemnification of settlement amounts,216 concern not to
"encourage socially undesirable conduct" is one of the policy underpinnings of a statute on the subject of indemnification and advance of
expenses set forth in the Model Act exposition.217

215.
216.
217.

Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 750.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 750.
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What is the likelihood that a board member, intent on committing an
intentional breach of duty, would be prospectively influenced by the
availability of board approved payment of settlement amounts to proceed
with such a breach? The practical concern would be that a director,
unable to purchase insurance218 protection for intentional breaches of
duty, would view the availability of board approved indemnification as
a security for malfeasance. The director would presumably view the
board as a reliable ally that would act without reference to the usual
statutory standard for granting indemnification-a finding that the
director had a good faith belief her action was in, or not opposed to, the
best interests of the corporation. 219 To conclude that deterrence value
is lost by allowing boards to indemnify directors for settlement requires
a belief that a prospectively breaching director would place faith in the
probability of a board decision to indemnify in defiance of the statute,
with the attendant liabilities on, and reputational harm to, board members
acting in breach of their own duties. Given the mechanisms for assuring
a disinterested board for indemnification determinations, 220 the specter
of lawless boards acting in such an unchecked fashion is unrealistic.221
Will boards of directors never abuse the power to indemnify directors
for amounts paid in settlement? Certainly some will. The risk of abuse
is highest when the settlement follows the court's rejection of a

218. See BLOCK, ET AL., supra note 4, at 993 (overwhelming majority of
indemnification statutes authorize corporations to purchase and maintain liability
insurance for directors and officers); id. at 1075-83 (describing "D & O" insurance crisis
of the mid-1980s).
219. See supra note 87.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 157-67.
221. See Dooley, supra note 30, at 507 (arguing that directors are unlikely to
forgive morally culpable cheating in comparison with treatment of mistakes in
judgment).
Indeed, the preference of boards to dismiss derivative litigation is said to be
encouraged by a boardroom culture that views derivative suits as unscrupulous. James
D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 89 (1985).
Since a settlement is an acknowledgment that the suit has merit, it may be a more
difficult decision for a board subject to bias against such suits than the decision to seek
dismissal, despite the protective aspect of also proving indemnification of the liability
to a fellow director.
In addition, after a board acknowledges liability, deciding to indemnify on the grounds
that the director has met the applicable standards is arguably a weightier moral judgment
than asking a court to dismiss a suit on the grounds that continuing the suit is not in the
best interests of the corporation (which may be made without regard to the moral
culpability of the defendant director). If a board engages in a sequence of reasoning by
which it a) concludes that the suit has sufficient merit for a settlement and b) concludes
that indemnification of the director for the settlement payment is not defensible, the
. usual readiness of boards to seek dismissal may well diminish, despite the logically
distinct nature of the questions posed by settlement versus dismissal.
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corporation's motion to dismiss on best interests grounds, or when
indemnification occurs in the post-settlement period independently of the
settlement. In the first case, the corporation may be seeking to
overcome a judicial determination that the suit should proceed; in the
second situation, the board is permitting circularity to occur, in
circumstances reminiscent of indemnification of adverse judgments, that
is, without any corresponding corporate benefit. Yet the flagrant nature
of such abuse militates against ready resort to it by faithless boards.
Courts, in command of procedural history, may hesitate to approve
settlements that seek to vitiate a judicial finding that a suit should
proceed. Likewise, directors may be hard pressed to justify payments of
settlement amounts to defendants who settled with no assurance that
indemnification would occur.
In sum, the risk of abuse is real, but far from uncontainable or
inevitable. Each corporate dispute has its own personality, with
possibilities for constructive settlements or misuse of statutory process.
For the reasons discussed above, the probability of abuse should not be
estimated to be so high that the benefits of board authority to indemnify
amounts paid in settlement are overlooked. On the other side of a
balance scale from the risk of abuse sit the benefits of closing the gap
that now prohibits boards from seeking the cheapest, most expeditious
manner of ending litigation that they conclude is not in the company's
best interests.
V.

A NOTE ON THE CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING SETTLEMENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF DERIVATIVE SUITS

It has been suggested above that the ready equation of the prevalence
of settlement in corporate litigation with negative conclusions about the
usefulness of such litigation may be a too ready assumption that
corporate settlements do not produce socially useful results. While it is
beyond the scope of this Article to assess empirically the social utility
of settlements of corporate lawsuits, in particular derivative suits, it is
nonetheless useful to briefly consider the criteria that might form the
basis of an empirical evaluation. Galanter and Cahill have proposed
several categories of hypotheses of reasons why settlements in the
general context of litigation are useful. They label these as arguments
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concerning party-preference, cost-reduction, superior-outcome, and
superior general effects.222
Because, as discussed above in the summary of the argument, 223
settlement in derivative litigation is not, in standard terms, settlement,
but rather a purchased ending of a lawsuit, the settlement literature may
be seen as lacking direct relevance to settlement via indemnification.
Certainly, it is apparent that the first criterion is non-operative, since the
plaintiff is in large part an abstraction and the satisfaction of the
"players" is of no theoretical or practical importance. The cost reduction
criterion is applicable to, and is the principal component. of, the
"procedural" argument presented above.
As mentioned above, a derivative suit settlement shares in common
with real settlement the feature that the parties decide to reach a nonadversarial ending to a legal dispute. Despite the bloodless character of
any issues of party satisfaction, the decision to divert the litigation from
an adversarial pathway to final conclusion is a social collaboration,
involving parties who engage in different actions to end the suit cooperatively rather than to contest it. 224 The nature of the collaboration
is not preordained. The criteria that the settlement literature proposes for
assessing settlement compared with litigation are also suggestive of
opportunities in the shaping of statutory options for the termination of
litigation by which it may be possible to affect the moral content of the
process.
The superior-outcome and superior-general-effects categories contain
the criteria with potential application to, and conceptual development for,
derivative suit settlements. The specific criteria listed by Galanter and

222. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1350-56.
223. See supra part I.A.
224. In addition, the dispute is "real" in that it represents contested perspectives
generally associated with "insiders" and investors. However, it should be conceded that,
by hypothesis, the right solution can only be the decision that the court would have
made; the underlying assumption is that the parties do not have the capacity to find a
better resolution than the court.
This may appear to be in contrast to other settlements, where the parties have the
ability to compromise their selfish interests from the most expansive claim of entitlement
to an agreeable middle position. But the theory of settlement does not posit a universe
of legal disputes in which there are no right answers and the parties may supply any of
several equally valid answers, but a world in which the cost and uncertainty of
vindicating legal entitlements makes parties willing to accept less than their entitlements.
Because a party whose selfish interests are at stake chooses a compromise of entitlement,
the concern for legitimacy is not as sharply posed, but it is still present. See Galanter
& Cahill, supra note 42, at 1362 (discussing "full entitlement" standard). But see id. at
1347 (suggesting that actors may define disputes differently as a result of engaging in
settlement rather than adjudication). The theoretical difference between derivative suit
"settlements" and other settlements is not on the order of a chasm.
J
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Cahill under superior-outcome are golden mean, superior knowledge,
normative richness, inventiveness, more compliance, and personal
transformation. Under superior-general-effects are found deterrence,
moral education, mobilization and demobilization, and precedent and
patteming.225 While some of these seem more applicable to disputes
between individuals, several of them are evocative of the types of
benefits that could flow from an explicitly designed process for enabling
boards of directors to embrace settlements as constructive outcomes of
derivative litigation.
There is, however, no existing set of controlled experiments that might
provide a basis for tentative conclusions. Although certain states now
allow indemnification of settling directors, it does not appear likely that
these states provide a fertile territory for empirical comparisons with
practices in states that maintain the bar. The tendency to rely on
directors' and officers' insurance, for instance, does not seem likely to
be less pronounced in the former states. It seems fair to conclude, on
the available evidence, that the market for executive risk insurance is a
national one, in which the standards of coverage and practice are set
nationally and companies do not negotiate changed terms to reflect
individual circumstances, including the law of the state of incorporation.226 It also seems likely that the corporate mind-set created by the
national market and the prevalence of reliance on insurance for
protection of executives blunts the impact of variation in incentives to
purchase directors' insurance that might be created by the differences in
corporate statutes. For example, corporate lawyers in Michigan-which
permits indemnification of settling directors--represent both Michigan
corporations and Delaware corporations. Despite high levels of
sophistication, they do not differentiate the insurance needs of Michigan
and Delaware corporate executives, nor do outside attorneys report direct
experience with the insurance practices of their clients.227 The predominant views of derivative litigation appear to influence executives
and their advisers. General truths about the risk level for corporate
executives and the need for insurance are in circulation without reference
to state law variations.

225.
226.
227.
((Apr. 4,

See id. at 1371-87.
See Anderson et al., supra note 23, at 262 n.18, 286-89.
Telephone Interview with Cyril Moscow, corporate lawyer practicing in Mich.
1995).
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An alteration of statutes (more generally than in a handful of states)
that directed attention to settlement as a viable and approved alternative
might influence the climate of sophisticated opinion about derivative
litigation and thus reshape practices. The necessity for insurance might
be rethought; pricing could be affected. While the assumption that the
board would only settle those cases that the court would dismiss leaves
a chunk of liability for which prospective indemni:fica{ion does not
protect a director, the moral climate should be nonetheless altered and
some of the negative response to director exposure to lawsuits softened.
It would be clear that the unindemni:fiable legal exposure would be for
acts that.resemble, in moral quality, theft from the corporation, for which
the court would determine that litigation of the matter is in the best
interests of the corporation, despite the many costs and negative factors.
The potential for practice to evolve, as it has been suggested it might
in the area of corporate purchase of insurance, has relevance to the
issues of moral education as well as precedent and patterning. Two
concerns about the effect of settlement on these criteria of the social
utility of dispute resolution might arise from the phenomenon in
litigation of confidentiality agreements. First, moral education would be
compromised by settlements that relieve a director of :financial exposure
and obscure the facts of the case. Second, precedent and patterning
would be reduced by private settlements that are not published. In
addition, settlements, even if published, might not produce law in the
sense that judicial decision-making does.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the relevant comparison
remains that between cases the court would have dismissed and cases
that the board settles. In such cases, when the court dismisses the case
on the basis of corporate best interests, it will have affirmed that the
charges have legal substance. But the focus of the court is not on
resolving the charges. The court, therefore, does not typically produce
fine-grained analysis of the alleged breach.228 A settlement of the
same charges has the potential to equal or exceed in educative function
the court opinion dismissing the case. The nub of the matter is a
requirement of disclosure that precludes standard confidentiality
agreements, in which the settling parties recite that the act of settling
does not constitute an admission.
Further development of a requirement of disclosure, such as has been
included in section 16.21 of the Model Business Corporations Act, could

228. Cf Black, supra note 25, at 584 (suggesting that judges have limited power
to create nontrivial corporate law).
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enhance the "general effect"229 by avoiding what Galanter and Cahill
refer to as "the appropriation for private benefit of the public goods
produced by the dispute processes"230 as a result of confidentiality
agreements. When considering the comparison of indemnification-driven
settlement and court dismissal, the comparison should be made in light
of the opportunity to shape the process by which settlements are
fashioned.

VI.

A.

CONCLUSION

An Alternative Approach: Court Approval?

This Article suggests that the ddecision to indemnify payments made
in settlement could be treated as simply one more aspect of corporate
life where boards exercise their discretion. If the risk of abuse is
considered to be greater than this proposal for a strong board role in
indemnification of settlement amounts acknowledges, the option of court
approval of such indemnification may appear an attractive middle
position.
As. previously noted, the Model Act contains a provision for court
approval. 231 It is framed, however, without fashioning a statutory
format for the board to exercise any function. Indeed, the discussion
above has accorded little emphasis to the Model Act provision for court
approval, instead it has suggested that the provision is best denominated
as an escape valve and has treated the Model Act as one that removes
the board from the process of awarding indemnification for settlement
payments. By its terms, the Model Act court approval provision
excludes the board from any statutorily assigned role. The only party
that can petition for such payment is the director, who must establish
that the award would be "fair and reasonable."232 The commentary to
the relevant sections speaks of the process somewhat cryptically:

229. See supra text accompanying note 225.
230. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 42, at 1386.
231. See supra note 14.
232. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §8.54(a) (3d ed. 1994). Indeed, the Model
Act drafters themselves state: "[F]or the unusual situation, an 'escape hatch' is provided
in section 8.54(a)(3), permitting a court to order indemnification for settlements of
derivative proceedings." Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 1, at 743-44.
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A director seeking court-ordered indemnification or expense advance under
section 8.54{a)(3) must show that there are/acts peculiar to his situation that
make it fair and reasonable to both the corporation and to the director to
override an intra-corporate declination or any otherwise applicable statutory
prohibition against indemnification, e.g., sections 8.5l(a) or (d) ....
It should be emphasized again, however, that the director seeking indemnification must make a showing· of fairness and reasonableness and that exercise
of the power granted by section 8.54(a)(3) is committed to the court's
discretion. 233
.

Both the form of the statute, confining the moving party to the
director herself, and the commentary appear to envision a situation in
which, after settlement occurrs, a director may attempt to convince a
court either of her rectitude or some extraordinary circumstance that
would allow the court to soften the generally applicable rule. The
provision does not fill the gap, discussed above, in the ability of the
board to fashion a settlement of which indemnification is an essential
part. Put another way, the Model Act places the focus on whether
atypical circumstances justify a director's petition for discretionary courtordered indemnification rather than whether the best interests of the
corporation demand that the board provide indemnification.
To be sure, a corporation could utilize the Model Act to permit boards
to indemnify as part of a settlement package. The director, who must
make the motion for indemnification, could function as a transmitter of
the work product of the corporation's lawyers arguing their case for the
wisdom of indemnification. A court, overlooking the structure of the
Model Act provision as an after-the-fact appeal for court mercy, might
then order indemnification as part of the settlement process without
applying rigorously the statutory guidance to search for "peculiar
circumstances" that appeal to the court's conscience. At best, this is
a backhanded approach, the application of which is uncertain and thus
of limited utility as a board asset in settlement negotiations.
More importantly, the wresting away of the provision from its
intended use as a backstop to assure fairness to individuals234 to an
unintended use as part of a board managed settlement · creates the
undesirable effect of insulating the board from responsibility for, or
liability resulting from, improper indemnification. If a corporation
succeeds in achieving its purpose to indemnify.by means of a director's
motion appealing to the court's mercy, the board of the corporation
escapes all accountability for a board action. The corporation has made
no court motion, as it does in the case of a motion to dismiss, and thus

233.
234.
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need not take the reputational risk associated with corporate endorsement
of the indemnification. In addition, it has not taken any corporate action
for which the responsible board members could be held personally liable.
The Model Act provision is, therefore, not a good source for a middle
position of allowing court approval. If court approval is to be the
mechanism for increasing the board's capacity to settle derivative
litigation but subjecting board recommendations to a heightened judicial
review,235 court-accorded indemnification should be at the
corporation's behest and based upon an explicit consideration of two
criteria: 1) the director has met the statutory standards for indemnification; and 2) granting of indemnification will serve the corporation's best
interests.
Whether such a mechanism for court approval constitutes a superior
approach depends upon the estimate of the gain received as a result of
additional court process compared with the increase in expense
associated with additional judicial review. Because the hearing that
would occur under a statute allowing the corporation to seek court
approval of payment of settlement amounts would occur without the
presence of an advocate against the proposition that indemnification
would serve the corporation's interests, the additional scrutiny is not of
the character that can be expected in a litigated dismissal proceeding.
Thus, the amount of additional confidence in the result that is purchased
with an increase in legal expenses and time and with a reduction in the
assurance the corporation can provide directors during negotiations is
unclear.. Moreover, court approval, even where the corporation makes
the motion, at least partially cheapens the moral currency with which the
board pays the settlement amount to a present or former colleague.
Thus, the middle ground of court approval does not appear to be a
good compromise point, for it lacks the quality of a sound compromise.
A sound compromise should be that, except for the areas of intended
concession, the position being compromised-here, a policy against
overly convenient avenues for boards to indemnify settlement
amounts--is not otherwise worsened. For better or worse, the question
presents a choice between competing visions of corporate law and

235. The level of attention accorded to the fees awarded to plaintiffs' attorneys in
derivative litigation might be a useful comparison. For an example of such court review
of fees, see In re Oracle, 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-59 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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reality.
choice.

Drafters of codes should, rather than temporize, make the

B.

Procedural Argument: Conclusion

The bar on indemnification of settlement amounts is by no means cost
free for corporations that engage routinely in complex transactions that
invite second-guessing of their agents by shareholders. Were the case
against allowing such payments a strong one that stood up well to
critical scrutiny, the cost might well be seen as necessary. But the case
in favor of allowing boards, in the exercise of their fiduciary duty and
with due regard for the consequences of its breach, to conclude that the
corporation will benefit from expeditious consensual conclusion of a
particular suit has sufficient substance to suggest that the benefits and
burdens of the bar need a new weighing. An effort to compromise is
not advisable, however. The choice should be taken between the
traditional bar on indemnification of settlement amounts and the proposal
for a fuller board role set forth herein. Drafters should avoid fudging
the choice by adding court review, the benefits of which are doubtful
and the effect of which may be, ironically, to lighten the board's sense
of accountability for an indemnification payment.
C.

Configuring Policy-New Alternatives?

The choice of allowing indemnification of directors for settlement
payments need not be conceptualized starkly as a yes or no option within
an unchanged existing system of derivative litigation. Derivative
litigation is not a naturally occurring phenomenon of invariant moral
content. 236 The participants take their guidance from the statutory
narrative that validates the roles they play.
The existing statutory grid for disposing of derivative litigation is
substantially determined by a set of debates over subtle variations in
emphasis on the business judgment rule and structural bias that give
greater or lesser encouragement to the use of derivative litigation to

236. Compare Black, supra note 25, at 576.
We usually evaluate changes in corporate law taking as given the attitudes of
the people affected by the change. That assumption works well for local
change, but may fail for global change. Ifwe don't allow for cultural change,
a global change may seem worse than the current set of rules when it is really
an improvement. Yet allowing for cultural change in designing optimal rules
is nearly impossible. How can we do more than speculate about how culture
might change?
Id.
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monitor director conduct.237 These debates have been fully vetted and
are not a likely source for new policy initiatives in legislation setting the
balance of power between the participants in derivative litigation.

1.

Time to Shop for a New Model of Raincoat?

A potentially more fertile source of ideas for policy configuration is
a careful look at how the statutes might effect a socially useful process
in which corporate boards make self-assessments leading to defensible
outcomes of derivative litigation. This context-seeking to insert moral
accountability and visible resolutions of claims of director misconduct
into derivative litigation--could become the basis for a more textured set
of statutes, designed to create incentives for corporations to create
credible processes for resolving charges of directorial misconduct. The
current statutory practice of extending standard treatment to corporations,
including uniform availability of liability limiting charter provisions,
could be rethought to make available alternative regimes of accountability conditioned upon differing corporate approaches to shielding directors
from financial risk.
Current statutes produce a system of substantial buffering of directors
from liability, despite the continued existence of doctrines to police their
adherence to fiduciary duty. In particular, the statutes contain an
authorization for a "raincoat" protection for all directors, granted
unconditionally without regard to the alignment of powers and interests
between directors, management, and shareholders in any given corporation and without regard to the risks associated in any given corporation
with director malfeasance.
The first obvious alteration of that unconditional grant of exoneration
in a manner sensitive to context should be for it to. be withdrawn from
the decision of a board to indemnify a director for settling a derivative
lawsuit. States that allow such indemnification should amend their
statutes and states that adopt such a grant of indemnification power
should only do so in connection with amending their raincoat provision.
The argument against the proposal would be that directors would not use
the indemnification procedure if they took on such exposure in doing so;
if true, nothing would be lost from the present system. But those boards
that had the confidence in their integrity, legal knowledge, and practical

237.

See Coffee, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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judgment would have the opportunity to act in the interests of the
corporation and with appropriate, wholesome disclosure. Given the
variety of corporations and corporate legal and investor environments,
this freeing up of the corporate statute from the strictures of cold-eyed
realism-wholesale exoneration because lawsuits are generally suspect
and a bar on indemnification of settlements because boards are generally
suspect-would be a constructive beginning in the direction of more
nuanced statutes.

2.

Liability by Menu?

Other more thorough-going changes can be imagined. Instead of a
unitary system applicable to all corporations, there could be a menu
approach, which corporate charters can elect. The theoretical pricing by
shareholders can be hypothesized to move corporations toward regimes
more highly valued by shareholders. While proposals of menu
approaches in other corporate law contexts238 have languished, the
degree of discontent with corporate litigation may make experimentation
more attractive than in areas where problems are perceived as heavily
theoretical.
How might these choices of regime be designed? One possibility
would consist of the following combination of features of the regime of
liability for an electing corporation:
1) No bar on indemnification of settlements;
2) No raincoat provisions at all;
3) Creation of a guardian ad litem, to whom plaintiff lawyers report;
and
4) Limitation of insurance coverage of directors to amounts for
draconian liability.
The guardian ad litem mechanism is similar to a proposal in the
Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1994 for securities class actions.239 One should recall once more that a hypothesis that no
corporation would elect this or that no board member would serve is not
fatal, since it is only presented as an available choice in a statutory menu
of regimes of liability. The existence of one corporation that, on its own
motion, disclaims the use of directors' and officers' insurance has been
previously noted. 240 Statutory rewards might well nudge other corporations in similar directions.

238. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19135 (1982) (proposing issuer
control over policy on including shareholder proposals in issuer's proxy statement).
239. See supra note 4.
240. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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3.

Getting More Radical: Changing Lawyers' Incentives

A m.ore radical proposal would be to afford electing corporations a
statutory limitation of lawsuits against them. to ones in which the
shareholders' attorney is drawn from. a cadre of lawyers certified as
corporate monitors, with an ethical code that specifies that the interests
of the corporation m.ust be regarded as their "client's" interests. Fees
would be paid from a fund created by contributions in lieu of insurance
premiums. While the savings from foregoing insurance coverage would
be reduced, there would be a considerable gain in the credibility of the
process brought about by severing the attorneys' incentives from the
search for an award of attorneys' fees the size of which is tied to the
benefit brought to the corporation by the litigation.
The alternative described m.ay be too greatly at odds with fundamental
features of our system. of litigation; a politically viable and prudent
method for constructing the list of attorneys would be a knotty problem.
One possibility is for an electing corporation to publish annually the list
of attorneys it has certified for the role; shareholder advocates could
em.ploy adverse publicity to penalize corporations that did not choose
attorneys deemed credible and competent. Another possibility is to
create a body to certify such lawyers. While either of these methods is
a radical departure from. the entrepreneurial model of lawyering2 41 that
now controls the dynamics of corporate litigation, the problems of an
entrepreneurial driven system have been diagnosed and regretted
endlessly. Experimentation that departs from. that system, rather than
merely tinkering with the balance of adversarial power in an entrepreneurial system, would be useful. An additional benefit might be the
education of a body of lawyers practicing at the state level who were
drawn to corporate law for reasons of public service rather than an

241. Nonetheless, it would still enjoy the benefits of the private development of
legal resources and their provision through market-based private entrepreneurs,
particularly if the control on the identity of the lawyers was corporate disclosure. By
way of contrast, other solutions to the ills of the entrepreneurial system impose greater
probable costs. For instance, Judge Winter has suggested a special master with the
authority to stop a lawsuit when it passes the point of bringing benefit to investors. This
is a mechanism bearing some resemblance to a court, with the same type of associated
costs but constituting an, additional layer above and beyond the court itself. In contrast,
a special corps of corporate monitor attorneys would have the potential to decrease costs
by substituting a less costly style of lawyering for a more profit-oriented one.
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original enthusiasm for the elegance of corporate law or for a business
lawyer's legal practice serving managerial interests. A more general
literacy about corporate law might be encouraged, and perhaps perspectives from outside the corps of corporate management lawyers would be
articulated with greater sophistication than general critics of corporate
practice now muster.
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